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Abstract
In the face of ever increasing civil conflict in Central America, the United States is
attempting to grapple with immigration reform as the number of refugees continues to rise.
Though the dominant narrative seems to indicate that people are flocking to the United States for
economic opportunity, upon further analysis it seems that there are a variety of push and pull
factors for migration to the United States. In this thesis three case studies of Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala are analyzed to determine the push and pull factors causing migration
to the United States. After examining the push and pull factors for migration, this thesis
examines what factors play into whether a person from these countries is granted refugee status.
Ultimately the thesis concludes that regardless of the push or pull factors, refugee status is
determined by whether the political ideology of the regime the person is fleeing is compatible
with the political agenda of the current US presidential administration.
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Introduction
When examining the current US political climate, the media would seem to indicate that
there is an unprecedented number of people migrating to the United States. Given the perception
that there is a rise in immigration to the United States, there has been a lot of political backlash
on the subject. During his first State of the Union address, President Trump stated, “his proposal
to offer 1.8 million undocumented immigrants a pathway to citizenship, dramatically scale back
legal immigration and spend billions on a border wall. His only explicit reference to Dreamers,
however, was his line that, “Americans are dreamers, too.1” The current immigration
discussions are a byproduct of decades without immigration reform that has allowed an
inefficient system to continue. Additionally, the recent consequences of detrimental US foreign
policy that was created in the interests of the United States economy and not in the interest of the
nations these policies were placed upon has spurred massive amounts of migration from Central
America. The specific question this thesis will attempt to answer is how US policy increased the
drive to migrate, and how the US response to increased migration has changed over time.
Causes for migration are often hard to define, given that the reasons are co-constitutive
rather than singular reasons for deciding to migrate. If one were to examine the dominant
political narrative the primary reason to migrate is for better economic opportunity. While
increased economic status is an incentive to migrate, often the reason behind migration is for
much further than money. One of the issues that is troubling nations around the world is how
should violence caused by non-state actors be categorized, and does that violence justify
populations being categorized as refugees. For example, during wartime it is easier to identify if

Everett, Burgess and Seung Mink Kim and Elana Schor. “Democrats furious over Trump's immigration rhetoric.”
Politico. January 31, 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/31/state-of-the-union-democrats-congress379571
1
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a population meets the categories of what it means to be a refugee, but those categories are
harder to define as the war ends but the violence continues through non-state actors. Given the
current parameters set by international law, the interpretation of what is and is not a refugee is at
the discretion of the country they are attempting to enter. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to
better comprehend the push and pull factors of migration, and how those factors align with US
immigration policy. As the rationales for migration are complex and situationally dependent, this
thesis will focus on the factors of migration for Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. By using
three countries in the same region allows for a greater control of variables, while also giving
insight to an oft overlooked region in the migration literature.
The first chapter of this thesis will discuss the literature that exists on definitions between
migrant versus refugee, and how international law has attempted to apply these definitions. The
second chapter will explain the methods used in this thesis, and will also identify the hypotheses
that will be analyzed throughout this thesis. The third chapter will be an analysis of US foreign
and economic policy in Central America, and how those caused the push factors of violence and
economic inequality to increase the amounts of migration. The fourth chapter will be an analysis
of US immigration policy, and how that impacted the migration of people from Central America
to the United States. The fifth chapter will analyze modern US foreign and economic policy, and
how the lack of changes in immigration has influenced current attempts at migration from
Central America to the United States. The sixth and final chapter will discuss additional findings,
opportunities for future research, and thoughts on what the future could look like to change the
refugee definitions.

6
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Literature Review
What is A Migrant?
The literature is in consensus that there are many differing rationales as to why a person
would want to migrate, although the general understanding of a migrant is nearly universal. Per
the United Nations Education and Cultural/Social Organization, migrants are defined as “a
person who leaves her or his country to live, and they typically seek work in other places either
temporarily or permanently.”2 However, the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants defines a
migrant worker as a “person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a State of which she or he is not a national.”3
Hence, the definition of migrant leads to the following legal interpretation:
"The term 'migrant' in article 1.1 (a) should be understood as covering all cases where
the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of
'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling factor."4
Even though the definition by the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants is broader than the
definition proposed by the UN Education and Cultural/Social Organization, neither definition
considers how external factors spur migration. Conversely the International Organization of
Migration defines migration as “any person who is moving or has moved across an international
border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the
person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes

2

"Migrant/Migration." Migrant | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Accessed March
08, 2018. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/internationalmigration/glossary/migrant/.
3
UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group of Intergovernmental Experts on the Human
Rights of Migrants submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/15, 10 March
1998, E/CN.4/1998/76, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00efd714.html [accessed 8 March 2018]
4
UN Commission on Human Rights, 10.
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for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.”5 Therefore, those definitions provide
a general understanding as to what constitutes a migrant, but those definitions are not sufficient
to encompass the reasons that people might feel forced to migrate.
Migrant is a term that has a plethora of definitions, but in can be categorized into
primarily three categories by acknowledging the distinctions between categories of migrants. As
Khalid Koser states in International Migration: A Very Short Introduction the first distinction
one must make when discussing a migrant is whether the migration was forced or voluntary.
Forced migration traditionally refers to refugees. Refugees are generally defined as people who
leave their country of origin/residence to avoid conflict, persecution, or environmental issues
(droughts or floods). The second distinction between categories of migrants is are migrants
moving for political or economic reasons. Migrants who are leaving due to economic reasons are
classified as labor migrants who are further categorized by where they are highly skilled, semiskilled, or low skill workers. Finally, migrants may move for social reasons which include:
marriage, family reunification, love, or those who have found work abroad.6 Although these
categories are useful to determining reasons for migrants, this thesis will use more precise
terminology when referring to categories of migrants.
Richard Perruchorud and Jillyanne Redpath Cross in the Glossary on Migration define
every type of migration. The following are the most relevant definitions of migration for the
thesis:

International Organizatino for Migration. 2011. “What is A Migrant?" International Migration Law Series No. 25,
2011
6
Koser, Khalid. 2007. International Migration: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford
University Press.
5
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Assisted migration: when a migrant receives help from a government, governments or
an international organization.

Clandestine migration: When a migrant violates immigration requirements of the
country they are entering.

Cross border migration: A process of movement of persons across international
borders.

Economic migrant: A person who is leaving her or his state of residence outside of her
or his country of origin to improve their quality of life.

Family migration: A general concept covering family reunification and the migration of
a family unit.

International migration: Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the
country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily
in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed.

Irregular migration: Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the
sending, transit and receiving countries.7

Labor migration: Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own
country of residence, for employment.

7 For the duration of this thesis I will use the term irregular migration to refer to persons who migrate to a new
country without the required thesis work deemed necessary by the state they are entering, instead of terms like
illegal migration or illegal immigration.
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Less skilled migrant: A less or low-skilled worker, on the other hand, is a person who
has received less training than a semi- skilled worker or, having not received any training,
has still acquired his or her competence on the job.

Long term migrant: A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual
residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively
becomes his or her new country of usual residence.

Mass/collective migration: The sudden movement of large number of persons.

Migrant: Migrant refers to persons whose decision to migrate was taken without concern
for external factors, and merely concerns for personal convenience. Thus, it applies to
people who are moving to another country to improve their material or social conditions,
and possibly improving the prospects for themselves and their families. The United
Nations defines migrant as an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more
than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular
or irregular, used to migrate.

Orderly migration: The movement of a person from her or his current place of residence
to a new place of residence, and still abiding by the laws and regulations concerning exit
from a country and entry into the destination/host country.

Spontaneous migration: An individual or group who initiate and proceed with their
migration plans without any outside assistance. Spontaneous migration is usually caused
by push- pull factors and is characterized by the lack of State assistance or any other type
of international or national assistance.
11

Undocumented migrant: A non-national who enters or stays in a country without the
appropriate documentation. This includes, among others: a person (a) who has no legal
documentation to enter a country but manages to enter clandestinely, (b) who enters or
stays using fraudulent documentation, (c) who, after entering using legal documentation,
has stayed beyond the time authorized or otherwise violated the terms of entry and
remained without authorization.8

By utilizing this precise terminology, the causes and rationale behind migration will
hopefully more accurately ensure that the literature on migration aligns with the accounts of
causes of migration, but these definitions still lack a contextualization as what is the difference
between a migrant and a person deserving of refugee status in the context of international law.

What is a Refugee?
The rights of refugee have been codified since King Ethelbert of Kent created laws
determining the punishment of those who violated the right of the church to be utilized as a place
of sanctuary. Conceptions of what it means to be a refugee is based in the legal doctrine of
asylum. Asylum was first defined by the Institute of International Law at its 1950 Session as:
" Asylum is the protection which a State grants on its territory or in some other place under
the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to seek it.9
While there are existing treaties that substantiate the right to be a refugee, there is not a set
universal procedure for under what circumstances a nation state is obligated to accept a refugee.
However, the principle of non-refoulment in law, in so far as a nation state has a duty not to send

Perruchoud, Richard and Jillyanne Redpath. 2011. “Glossary on Migration.” International
Migration Law 25 (2): 6-102.
9
Krenz, Frank E. 1966. "The Refugee as a Subject of International Law." The International And Comparative Law
Quarterly 1 (91): 91
8
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refugees back to their place of origin if there is reason to believe that they will be persecuted due
to race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership to a social group.10
In the modern era the rights of the refugee were codified post WWII in the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which states the conditions of a refugee must meet to be
determined a refugee. The person seeking refugee status must be a person outside his country of
origin or residence, must have left their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution
based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, and thus owing to such fear he is unable or unwilling to return.11 The treaty
had to be supplemented by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, because the
only refugees that were allowed to flee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, had to be associated with instances of persecution that occurred prior to 1951. This
was because the original intent of the treaty was only meant to protect those who were fleeing
from Europe after the human rights abuses that occurred during WWII. However, while the 1967
Protocol resolved the temporal and geographic limitations with the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, ultimately the treaty (and subsequent treaties) left the definition of
asylum up to interpretation by individual states. Therefore, currently states under customary
international law are obligated to allow refugees into their country, but without legal precedent

10

Krenz, 106
Toldedo, Giselle. "The Protection Of Refugees And Their Right To Seek Asylum In The European Union",
Collection Euryopa 70 (2011): 10-12.
11
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on how states should deal with those asking for asylum endorses the perpetuation of
discrimination towards refugees.1213
In the status quo refugees are protected under international law, but migrants are not
protected despite having similar justifications for leaving their home country. Both refugees and
migrants are fleeing “persecution, generalized violence, economic migration when violence
renders their business pursuits unsustainable, poverty, climate-change induced flight from famine
or rising seawaters that threaten to wipe entire states off the map, and other horrors still.”14
However the lack of codified and enforceable protection of refugees and displaced persons is
rooted in the conundrum of international refugee law implicating sovereignty issues, security
concerns, and political ideologies that various nation states hold. 15 To determine a person is a
refugee, there must be evidence of human right abuses (which might necessitate a state
intervening to protect another country’s citizens). Nation states are typically hesitant to violate
the sovereignty of another nation, and thus the protection of refugees and displaced persons
becomes even more complicated. Thus, while there is legal precedent to protect refugees, but
often the enforcement of the protection is based in the political interests of other nation states.

12

Without codifying how states should enable refugees to become permanent members of their host countries
hinders the host countries by not having a long-term solution of the problem of refugees. One of the possible
justifications for this phenomenon is that by fully integrating refugees into their host country through the process of
citizenship means that if they accept the new citizenship that they could never return to their home country. While
this justification makes sense it ignores the fact that there will be some refugees who will never want to return to
their home country, and thus should be provided with the option to fully integrate into their new host country
through naturalization.
13
Hathaway, James C. 2005. “The Rights Of Refugees Under International Law, 1st ed.”
14
Goldenziel, Jill I. 2016. "The Curse of the Nation State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in International Law."
Arizona State Law Journal 48, no. 3: 581
15
Goldenziel, 585
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Push and Pull Factors of Migration
There is a myriad of factors that influence a person to pursue migration, that are often
categorized as push and pull factors. Migration is often a response to a crisis within a state, but it
can also be an attempt for people to search for opportunity in a new location. Push factors in
migration include (bur is not limited to) lack of economic opportunity, political persecution,
legal persecution, fleeing from violence, or religious persecution. Those who are fleeing
persecution are often categorized as refugees attempting to obtain political asylum, whereas
people who are attempting to find better economic opportunities are deemed economic migrants.
Pull factors are reasons that one might be attracted to migrate to a certain location, which can
include increases in economic opportunity, freedom from persecution, freedom from societal
restrictions, the ability to pursue higher education, or even reuniting with family who has
previously migrated.1617 Migrants attempt to determine whether they will stay for an
indeterminate period or if they plan to return after they have met certain goals, but often we see
that migration is cyclical (Segal, 2002; Madrigal and Payadas, 2006; Lee, 1966).

In the context of Central American migration very few scholars have articulated the initial
reasoning behind why migrants choose a certain location. Per Repak’s analysis female domestic
workers from El Salvador migrated to Washington D.C., because they were the former workers
for US ambassadors in Central America. Those female workers helped to create the largest
Salvadorian community in the United States. There have been other recruitment efforts from
various low-skill level industries across America for Central American migrants, but there has

Segal, U. 2002. “A framework for immigration: Asians in the United States.” New York: Columbia University
Press.
17
This phenomenon is known as network effect, which is the idea where people migrate to a place where they have
an existing social network for economic and social support. These networks determine where migrants tend to settle
in their host country, and are the basis for initial acclamation in the new country.
16
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not been extensive research on this question (Zarrugh, 2008; Menjivar,2000:Repak, 1990).
However, once a migrant group has chosen a location, then social network theory is used to
communicate that migrants will move towards locations where they know other migrants who
have established themselves (Zarrugh, 2008; Light 2002). For this thesis, I am less concerned
with which locations that migrants choose, and am more concerned with their reasons for
migration.

16

Method
The purpose of my thesis is to identify major push and pull factors for migration,
specifically in Central America. According to the literature explained above there a multiplicity
of factors that spur migration among a group of people. These factors could include fleeing
violence, increased economic opportunity, educational advancement, and previous migration by
family members. Given the difference in these rationales it is hard to quantify the exact reason a
person decides to migrate, since their decision is often shaped by a combination of these factors.
The preferred method to analyze reasons behind migration would be a quantitative
analysis to track the increasing rates in migration and what causes them through interviews with
each migrant, refugee, or undocumented person entering the United States. However, given that
migration in the context of Central America comes during times of civil war, natural disasters,
and general internal strife migration continues to happen regardless of having proper
documentation. Additionally, those migrating to the United States are not always willing to
conduct interviews due to fears of deportation, which impacts the ability to acquire complete and
comprehensive datasets. In this paper, I will be utilizing a compilation of data sets to understand
potential reasons behind the waves of migration from Central America to the United States. The
use of three case studies allows for the claims to rationale behind migration to be substantiated as
countries undergo similar social conditions, but the case studies do have variations that allow for
control factors to determine primary and secondary rationales for migration.18 Thus, when
utilizing three case studies will lend enough support to evaluate hypotheses. However, part of the

18

Arend Lijphart. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." The American Political Science
Review no. 3: 682.
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limitations will be reduced by only analyzing two push factors across multiple case studies,
which will work to reduce the weakness of the analysis.1920
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this thesis will be the rate of legal/authorized migration by
people in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the United States. The rate of migration can
take on a variety of forms as it can include migration, asylum, visas, temporary status, etc. After
explaining the base rate of migration, I will analyze how each independent variable influences
the rate of migration.
Independent Variable
As there are a multitude of push and pull factors that influence migration, I will choose a
select few to analyze to understand the dynamics that exist in Central America in the context of
migration. The independent variables will be rooted in the literature and as such the list includes:
US policy in the region, economic inequality, violence, and US immigration policy.
The first variable is looming at how US policy differed in each nation, which is integral
to explaining the variable rates of migration from each nation. The first independent variable
that is key to this thesis is the impact of US foreign policy on migration patterns. While US
foreign policy did not initially heavily influence migration from Central America to the United
States, the impact of the Cold War heavily influenced migration in so far as it set the conditions
for the violence that would occur during the civil wars. The United States funded the anticommunist factions, which led to the conditions that fueled civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala,

19

Lijphart, 686
This analysis will have a plethora of weakness. The research will lack control variables due to the lack of
empirical data. Additionally, the thesis will only focus on Central America, and thus the findings may not be able to
be cross applied to other regions around the world. Furthermore, my thesis will only analyze a specific set of push
and pull factors, and therefore the findings may not be generalizable to every push and pull factor that causes
migration.
20
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and Nicaragua. While Honduras never experienced a civil war, when the United States lost
control of Nicaragua they made a new base in Honduras. Honduras was the site for US military
operations in the region, and was forced to deal with the violence that was spilling over into their
borders. As the US funded the anti-communist rightist regimes it escalated the amount of
violence, and as such had a heavy influence on increased migration. 21
The second independent variable is economic inequality in Central America as a factor
that spurs migration. This independent variable is two-fold in so far as there are reasons that
people migrate for economic opportunity, which is primarily the case for migration from
Honduras to the United States. However, the independent variable of economic inequality is an
explanatory variable for how systemic poverty in Guatemala spurred increasing violence (and
genocide) against the indigenous populations during the civil war.
The third independent variable is violence in Central America as a cause for migration to
the United States. Violence as an independent variable is important in both periods of analysis,
because the primary motivation was an attempt to escape the conflict of the civil war. Although
violence is the primary motivation for migration in the recent wave of child migrants as they are
attempting to flee the violence caused by gangs. The justifications for migration are still based in
violence, but it is important to see how the rates of migration change between state and non-state
actor sponsored acts of violence.
The fourth and final independent variable is US immigration policy. This paper will
analyze if migration changes in response to perceptions of more open immigration policy. Rate
of acceptance does depend on what the person is fleeing from in the context of political conflict,

21

Chinchilla and Hamilton, 1991
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and the political administration that is in power at the time of entry. Given the people are
overwhelmingly fleeing violence even contrarian US immigration policy has not deterred
migration, but it structure instances of increased migration to the United States.
Hypothesis
As there are limited case studies and minimal empirical data, it becomes difficult to
completely test a hypothesis. Despite this, here are potential hypothesis that could be tested with
actual research later. Support for these hypotheses will be rooted in the literature, and will at best
show relationships.
H1: As the amount of violence increases in a country (whether from a state or non-state actor),
the rate of migration will increase.
H2: As the level of systemic poverty/lack of economic opportunity increases in a country, there
will be an increased rate of migration.
H3: As the United States foreign policy becomes more interventionist in a country, the rate of
migration will increase.
H4: As the US immigration policy is perceived to be more welcoming to migrants, there will be
an increased rate of migration.
In the face of lack of empirical data, it will be impossible to determine if these relationships are
statistically significant, but overall qualitative data will able to support finding relationships to
support or deny these hypotheses.
Case Studies
Three case studies will be analyzed during this thesis. The first case study will be El
Salvador, which experienced a civil war with high levels of violence. While El Salvador

20

experienced a civil war it also has a clear start and end, whereas Guatemala had a civil war that
spanned several decades and had peaks of violence. The second case study will be Guatemala,
and like El Salvador experienced a civil war but also has instances of systemic poverty in the
context of indigenous populations. By including Guatemala, it allows analysis of how economic
inequality can create the conditions for violence, and serves as a key motivator for migration.
The third case study will be Honduras which did not experience a civil war, but did experience
violence flowing into its borders. All three of these case studies are currently experiencing high
levels of gang violence, and their citizens are primarily fleeing to the United States.22

22

Nicaragua was going to be included in this thesis, but ultimately as of late their citizens who are experiencing
gang violence are fleeing to Costa Rica instead of the United States, which would have provided additional analysis
but would have broaden the scope of the thesis to an untenable point.

21

Chapter One: Migration Push Factors in Central America 1960-1989
Introduction
To completely comprehend the push factors that influenced citizens to leave El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras it is critical to understand the role that US policy played in Central
America throughout history. Upon analyzing the ways in which US diplomatic efforts, economic
policy, and military responses shaped these nations we can then understand how violence and
economic inequality motivated people to migrate to the United States. This chapter will first
cover official US policy in the region, and then will analyze how those created conditions of
violence and economic inequality.
US and Central American Background
In 1950 American diplomat George Keenan outlined the three priorities that the United
States should have towards Latin America, “the protection of our raw materials, the prevention
of military exploitation by the enemy, and the prevention of psychological mobilization of Latin
America against us.”23 The overwhelming consensus is that the policy that the United States had
towards Central America was only focused on the protection of US private business interests in
the region.24 While that has been the overarching policy towards Latin America, there have been
other political projects that the United States has focused on in the region. Historical literature on
this question highlights the United States was focused on ensuring that Europe had very little
control in the region.25 US foreign policy attempted to utilize the Monroe Doctrine to prevent
European influence in the region, while also utilizing it as a justification for US expansion in the
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region.2627 US expansion and dominance in the region was paramount, especially given the
original interest in the region stemmed from the desire of the United States to create the Panama
Canal; however after that was implemented the focus on Central America shifted.282930
Central America was also given a high priority in US foreign policy, because it was an
open market with raw materials vital to sustain industrialization in the United States.31 Given that
Central America has been perceived as under the United States’ sphere of influence, the United
States has thus attempted to ensure that the economic policy and political climate in the region
aligned with the interests of the United States.32 Once the creation of the Panama Canal was
completed, the United States government’s interest in Central America waned while the interest
of private sector investment by US citizens increased.33
Since the United States’ interests have changed over time the policies and goals for
Central America by the United States have also morphed over time. Democracy promotion was
emphasized by the United States as a major factor in international decisions. Democracy
promotion in Central America by the United States occurred in waves and it was used as a
justification for military intervention in Central America, but it was not a major focus during the
Cold War.34 Often United States policy hindered the development of democracy in Central
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America. The United States enforced anti-communist policies through regime change in Central
America.35 In this chapter I explain how US policy in Central America spurred economic
inequality and undermined democratic prospects, creating the conditions for conflict and
violence. I examine the civil conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, and document
how economic inequality and violence have served as push factors fueling migration from the
region to the United States
United States Diplomatic Policy in Central America
To maintain the stability of the markets, the United States was heavily involved in
governmental operations in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. As these countries were
economically dependent on the United States, the United States could exert its influence over
policies and the appointment of new leaders and military presence in the area. Nicaragua was the
United States’ main ally in the region, and as a result the Somoza dictatorship received
significant military and financial backing from the United States.3637 Therefore, given that the
United States was creating economic policies that kept the Central American people in poverty
while also eliminating the chance for the political desires of the people to be accomplished
(because the United States was in control of who held office) it spurred civil unrest in Central
America that caused violence to occur.
According to the Historical Clarification Commission there were three primary historical
causes of the civil war in Guatemala: racism (particularly the exclusion of indigenous folks),
economic exclusions of the population in the primarily agrian society, and the influence of
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authoritarian political figures.38 One of the primary factors that led to the start of the civil war
was Guatemala’s history of authoritarian leaders that stretches back for centuries, and those
authoritarian rulers have worked to ensure that the indigenous folk have been politically
repressed into silence about government action.39
Although the factors did play into the start of the Guatemalan civil war, there were a
variety of more proximate causes that preceded the conflict. One of the largest proximate causes
to the Guatemalan civil war was the recent history of the process of overthrowing and appointing
leaders of the Guatemalan government combined with the rise of leftist politics. The beginning
of the controversial appointment process that lead to the rise of the Guatemalan civil war starts
with President Chacon. President Chacon ruled Guatemala from 1926 until 1931, when he
suddenly became so ill from a stroke which paralyzed him to the point that he was unable to
continue his term. In Guatemala Congress appoints three successors (called designees) in case
the President is deemed incapable of competing their term, and in accordance with the
Guatemalan constitution the Vice President Lic. Palma was appointed as President.40 However,
this appointment increased dissent from the rebellious factions, because technically Palma was
the second designee in line to the presidency.
The reason this caused controversy was because the person who was first in line for
succession was General Mauro de Le6n, who technically resigned as first successor when he was
given the task to run the military, because Cabinet members are barred from being designates to
the presidency. Dissenters used this controversy to state that by appointing Palma as President
the Guatemalan Congress was in violation of the Guatemalan Constitution. Despite various
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attempts to consolidate and legitimize his power (including obtaining successful recognition
from the United States), Palma’s government was toppled four days after its inception by a
military revolt led by General Manuel Orellana.41 General Orellana attempted to justify the
military revolt by stating it was an attempt to protect the process of democracy as outlined in the
1923 Treaty of Peace and Amity by preventing an undemocratic process of the dubious
appointment from continuing, which should be acceptable since coups were allowed in the treaty
so long as they were done to prevent violations of the democratic process.
US Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Sheldon Whitehouse quickly
returned to Guatemala to express the United States’ opposition to General Orellana’s military
revolt.42 While the United States desired the resignation of General Orellana the United States
also opposed the idea that the election could be run while General Orellana was in power,
because it would then ensure that the next President elected was a part of the military coup and
would just be a puppet for General Orellana.43 Thus, the United States had the Guatemalan
Congress reconvene outside of session in order to appoint Reina Andrade as the provisional
President, and then pushed for elections to be held quickly to ensure the new President had no
affiliation with those involved in the military revolt.4445 Consequently by the United States
promoting the idea of having an election shortly after the finalization of a provisional president,
the United States was able to ensure that a candidate with sympathies for the United States was
able to win the election since the Guatemalan Assembly members did not have enough time to
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find a candidate that would be able to beat Jorge Ubico. Ambassador Whitehouse disregarded the
complaints of the assembly members to promote the interests of the United States, and proceeded
to coordinate the election for the next President of Guatemala.46
The United States was paramount to the rise of Jorge Ubico, and the support from the
United States was due to Ubico’s own list of impressive political accomplishments. Ubico
completed his education in the United States and Europe, and rose quickly through the ranks of
the Guatemalan military. In addition to be an accomplished military man, his time as a governor
cemented the support as President. While he was the governor of Retalhuleu he had a host of
accomplishments including: eliminating the threat of desperados, elimination of the threat of
bandits, expanding access to education, instituted youth programs, and worked to eliminate
yellow fever in his state. Ubico managed to not get embroiled in the political conflict regarding
presidential succession until the call for nominations for the elections was announced. Ubico was
the only presidential candidate, and subsequently won the election with no effort.47
Ubico was an authoritarian ruler, and was the last of the caduillo leaders to hold office in
Guatemala. Ubico was technically under the liberalism party, but he ultimately used the
police/military to repress dissenting voices.48 His harsh repression to dissent was ultimately his
demise as a president. El Salvador General Maximiliano Martinez crushed a military revolt, but
was still subject to significant political backlash from labor strikes and various calls for the end
of his administration. General Martinez sought exile in Guatemala, and in response the teacher’s
in Guatemala proceeded to openly complain about the Ubico dictatorship. President Ubico
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consequently took away all the constitutional guarantees. Ubico ultimately was forced to
resigned in response to political pressure, which ushered in the decade of spring for Guatemala.49
After the fall of the Ubico regime was the decade of spring, which was a period in which
Guatemala experimented with democracy. In October 1944, Jorge Ubico was overthrown by a
conglomeration of students, teachers, military reformers, and a rising middle class.50 The
constitution of Guatemala was rewritten and two peaceful elections and transfers of power
occurred during this period. While the increase of democratic principles was perceived as
positive, this time also ushered in the rise of leftist politics when the government lifted the ban
on leftist political parties.51 Once the ban on leftist political parties was lifted the Partido
Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores was formed. Communism was the political ideology
associated with the PGT and their ideology influenced several reforms including: increased
funding of education, the creation of labor laws, elimination of forced labor/vagrancy laws,
creation of social security, and agrarian reform. Agrarian reform included nationalized the land
owned by the United Fruit Company, which was not popular among Guatemalan elites and the
United States. Combined with the fact that the new labor laws meant that most industries lost
their source of free labor led to a general opposition against President Arbenz.52
During the Korean War, President Eisenhower increased his criticism of the Arbenz
administration in Guatemala. President Arbenz led a three-person junta against the Ponce
government of Guatemala in 1951. His land reform program stated that all existing governmentowned farmland would be redistributed, and then set redistribution of private lands based on the
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size of the land. Therefore, the land controlled by the United Farm Company was nationalized,
and did not receive compensation they thought was fair for the loss in property. The United
states mobilized support inside and outside of Guatemala to remove President Arbenz, and
provided the CIA with a three-million-dollar budget to conduct the overthrow proceedings. Once
the United States stopped a secret shipment of Czechoslovakian weapons to Guatemala, the
United States felt justified in their invasion against Arbenz. Ultimately former aranista officer
Carlos Armas led the charge of military opposition against the Arbenz government by invading
through Honduras. Coupled with a misinformation campaign broadcasted on the radios,
President Arbenz resigned to prevent incurring the wrath of the United States in 1954.53 CIA
forces overthrew the regime in 1954 to protect the economic interests of the United Fruit
Company.54
Shortly after the resignation of Arbenz, Guatemala was embroiled in a civil war.
According to the Guatemalan Truth Commission the national trauma that occurred because of
the 1954 coup ensured that collectively the people who were just starting to participate in the
political process in Guatemala were more inclined to participate in rebel forces leading to the
guerrilla insurgency.55 Post Arbenz administrations did not ultimately fare well in the
maintenance of the power in Guatemala. President Armas functionally had an anti- communist
dictatorship, but was still deemed inept by the United States and could not stop the cries for a
return to the constitutional democracy that Guatemala had previously. President Armas was
assassinated in 1957, his successor was ultimately usurped, and a rise of mass protests erupted
around the nation (and they were met with violence and repression). The Guatemalan civil war
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started in 1962, and continued until the 1990’s with varying intensities of violence in the
country.56
According to the Historical Clarification Commission, there were a total of 42, 275
victims of the Guatemalan civil war. Of these victims 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution
and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearance (eighty-three percent of fully identified victims
were Mayan and seventeen percent were Ladino). Thus, the report concluded that the total
number of people were killed or disappeared because of this civil war is over 200,000. The civil
war itself was a series of military coups to oust presidents, and violent repression by the state
towards guerilla groups. Dissent was crushed by all groups during the civil war, and in response
coups occurred to institute new heads of state given rule of law had been virtually eliminated
through sate repression. In the thirty-year conflict, the most violent period came upon the rule of
General Efrain Rios Mont. General Monnt led a series of massacres that destroyed entire
villages, and from 1981-1983 forced the displacement of between 500,000 to 1,500,000 million
people from Guatemala (primarily Mayans). In addition to destroying villages, the soldiers
involved in the civil war were known to rape and torture victims that they could capture. The
civil war was a product of power consolidation by a wealthy minority, an unstable democracy,
US intervention, and racism.57
Similarly, El Salvador has a cyclical pattern regarding the consolidation of power: a new
regime will exist, the new regime will be intolerant of dissent and increase repression of
dissension, in response to repression there will be a coup d’état led by progressives, reforms will
occur, the army will have a conservative faction that wants power, and the cycle starts all over.
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This pattern has happened approximately six times between December 1931 and January 1980 in
El Salvador.58
On October 25, a bloodless coup overthrew the Osorista regime. El Salvador was now
ruled by a six-man junta with three civilians, and this regime was willing to the United States
play a key role in national politics (Montgomery, 49). The regime decided to dissolve the
National Assembly and the Supreme court. When the regime attempted to introduce themselves
to the military, the officers at the time were unsatisfied at how the junta answered questions
about national security. The junta did not have a definable plan on how to repress the vocal
communist and leftist groups, and the junta did not have a policy as to how the army would
retain its prominence in national politics. Thus, due to the lack of understanding of the role of the
military in the new regime, the officers in the San Carlos barracks decided to overthrow the
regime. Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera was head of the new anti-communist and anti- Cuba
junta in El Salvador.59
El Salvador experienced the sixth cycle of power transition on October 15, 1979 with a
coup d’état. One unique feature of this coup d’état was that civilians were involved in the
planning of the operation from the beginning.60 Lieutenant Colonel Guerra and Rodrigo Guerra
were US educated brothers who were frustrated at the status of economic injustice in their nation,
and decided to rally support to force Romero out of office. However, three key events happened
before the actual start of the coup d’état. Members of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc occupied
the Metropolitan Cathedral, the Sandinista National Liberation Front ended the Somoza dynasty,
and President Romero gave a speech that caused a break in the alliance between the army and
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oligarchy in Guatemala. While the coup d’état did occur, President Romero was able to leave
due to a spy infiltrating the planning of the coup d’état. President Romero left for Guatemala and
abandoned his position.61 When President Romero fled the country, the civil war in El Salvador
approached quickly.
While El Salvador had experienced coups in the past, the October coup would alter
power dynamics that had been present from 1932 to 1979 in El Salvador. The far-right wing
sector of the oligarchy created a political and military plan that would lead to the creation of the
paramilitary death squads. The armed forces decided to break their ties with the oligarchy, and
champion reforms by instituting a systematic policy of repression of anyone suspected of leftist
politics.62 Therefore, despite attempts to divorce their politics, the policies implemented by the
far-right oligarchy and armed forces ended up reinforcing the objectives of each other.
Initially US policy on politics in El Salvador after the coup was non-committal. There
was not a coherent policy objective, but the US did supply El Salvador with 5.7 million dollars in
aid.63 Once the US government transitioned from President Carter to President Reagan, the
policy towards El Salvador drastically shifted. Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first secretary of state,
noted the first change in policy towards El Salvador was the framing of the issue: “Salvador was
not merely a local problem. It was also a regional problem that threatened the stability of all of
Central America, including the Panama Canal and Mexico…And it was a global issue because it
represented the interjection of the art of national liberation into the Western Hemisphere.”
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Reagan introduced a threefold policy towards Central America: overthrow the
revolutionary govern in Nicaragua, establish a permanent military base in Honduras, and
militarily defeat the FMLN. Although the public only knew that Reagan was attempting to
promote the building of democracy in Central America. Ultimately despite the efforts of the
United States, the military policy towards El Salvador was a failure. The US was unable to
impart the importance of protecting human rights on the Salvadorian army, and the armed forces
in El Salvador was deemed incompetent regarding resisting the FLMN.64 Given the lack of
success of the United States in El Salvador, the US policy shifted to work towards peace talks to
end the conflict in El Salvador. An agreement to begin the cease fire started on February 1. The
Chapultepec accords were officially signed into law on January 16, 1992.65
When the United States lost Nicaragua as a satellite location through the overthrow of the
Somoza dictatorship by the Sandinista revolution, the United States had to find a new satellite
location to control the spread of communism in Latin America. El Salvador and Guatemala were
embroiled in conflict, and thus Honduras became the new base for US military operations to
fight communism in Central America.
Prior to the 1980’s, Honduras and Costa Rica were exceptions to the rampant political
violence and repression throughout Central America, as the demands of the people were often
met by compromise in these two countries.66 However, this perception shifted in the 1980’s as
the US influence in Honduras caused the start of politically based violence.67 Honduras differed
from El Salvador and Guatemala in that their economy was controlled by foreign elites, and
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lacked a localized economic elite. Additionally, Honduras did not have the widespread
inequitable land distribution that plagued El Salvador and Guatemala. Finally, the military in
Honduras was not created in response to violence but rather was an institution that was created to
keep order in the country.68697071 Although intended to be independent, the Honduran military
ended up ruling the country and was also controlled by the United States.72 President Reagan
transformed Honduras into an ally that would assist in ending the spread of communism in
Central America.
In contrast to Honduras, the United States policy towards El Salvador and Guatemala was
geared toward ending the conflict in these countries and eliminating the leftist governments.
Instead of creating a military infrastructure in El Salvador, the United States provided military
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assistance. El Salvador received 5.7 million dollars in military aid from the United States in
1986.73 That figure was drastically less than the 229.4 million dollars in 1984 and 132.5 million
dollars in 1985 that President Duarte could persuade the United States to send in military aid to
El Salvador, which was reduced in 1986 due to his inability to turn the government around. In a
similar vein, the aid that was sent to Guatemala was premised on the ability for Guatemala to
resolve the human rights abuses. Guatemala originally rejected aid from the United States,
because they did not wasn’t to have aid contingent on improving human rights. However,
ultimately the United States provided Guatemala with 33 million dollars in military aid during
the civil war.74
The main contrast to these countries in the context of US foreign policy is the amount of
involvement that the United States had in which areas. For example, the United States had
military presence in Honduras starting the 1954 which was instrumental to US setting up a
military base in Honduras after Nicaragua was lost as a site of US operations. In contrast, US
policy in Guatemala was involvement in influencing their elections to protect US foreign
business interests. Whereas in El Salvador the United States was not particularly involved in
elections, but the US just had a general influence on shifting the government policy to be
friendly to US businesses in addition to having military cooperation between the two nations.
United States Economic Policy in Central America
Economic interests of US businesses were the main drivers behind foreign policy
initiatives in Central America. When US investors started to build businesses in Central America
during the administration of President Harding, the United States government did not want to be
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responsible for protecting the creations of US investors with a security apparatus.7576 However
after President Harding, President Coolidge supported “dollar diplomacy,” which supported the
use of military interventions to protect the United States’ initial fiscal interventions in Central
America.77 Even when the United States made attempts to withdraw from its military
commitments, dollar diplomacy afforded the United States significant control of the inner
workings of many Central American governments. Therefore, the United States was constantly
involved in the political climate in Central America throughout the 20th century.787980 Central
America suffered the consequences for continued political meddling, because across the board
revenue made by countries with United States fiscal supervision performed worse than nations
without fiscal supervisions by the United States.81 Thus, despite the intentions of the United
States, Central America overall did not benefit from the economic policies and structures created
by the United States.

The start of US investment in Central America came with the Harding administration. President Hoover’s cabinet
had a variety of appointees with varying political ideologies and stances on US protection of foreign investments.
Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce, thought that the United States had an obligation to protect the
investments of American direct investors, American bankers, and the foreign governments that were being invested
in. Secretary Hoover thought that this would prevent foreign governments from irresponsible borrowing and benefit
future investments through ensuing that the investments would be protected by the United States government.
Andrew Mellon, the Secretary of Treasury, thought it was the responsibility of the investors to protect their
investments. Charles Hughes, the Secretary of State, worked with Andrew Young to create a policy that ensured
they would vet loans proposals and large investments, but the Department of State would not take responsibility for
protecting the products of the decisions made by the investors themselves. The Department of State would merely
take on an advisory role to potential investors.
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Trade liberalization was the main policy that US businesses pushed for, and this was
cloaked behind the phrase “trade not aid.” By focusing on the promotion of trade it ensured that
they could promote freer markets, which would allow foreign investment to expand. However,
the interests of businesses were threatened by the rise of leftist politics and communist ideology
expanded in Central America. Although the promotion of economic interests of the United States
was the overall strategy in the region, the methods to promote the economic interests of the US
varied across the countries.82
El Salvador was initially seen a prime location for US foreign investment because they
had the strongest outcries against communism and leftist politics in Latin America.83 The United
States established the Point Four Program in El Salvador, which provided technical specialists
and grant assistance in agriculture, health, industry, education, economics, and fisheries.84 In
contrast, the policy that the US promoted in Guatemala and Honduras was not an actual policy
program, but rather reducing the trade barriers in the country to allow unfettered expansion of
foreign investment.85 Although all three countries were incorporated into the Central American
Market, which would allow for “immediate free trade for almost all commodities originating in
member nations, and, in principle, [for] the free movement of capital and people.86 Upon
analyzing the policy of the United States in Central America, the United States was willing to
take any measures necessary to create economic stability in those countries and thus were willing
to intervene military to enforce stability of markets in the region.
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While the lowering of trade barriers led to foreign investment in Central America, there
was differing amounts of foreign aid that was given to each country by the United States. For
example, in Honduras, in addition to investment from foreign companies, the United States
invested millions of dollars into Honduras. During the Carter administration, Congress was
reluctant to provide funds to Honduras. Honduras while in name was a democracy, was not
exercising democratic practices. Ultimately President Carter was pleased with the democratic
moves made by General Paz (who wanted to legitimize his power without ceding power to the
National Assembly). Given the new commitment to democracy the United States in 1980
doubled its economic aid to 53.1 million dollars and military assistance increased from 2.3 to 3.9
million dollars.87
Guatemala was like Honduras in so far as the United States was instrumental to the
creation of military capabilities. While the United States’ involvement in the military affairs of
Guatemala existed prior to the civil war, it was the coup in 1960 that rapidly increased the US
involvement in the Guatemalan military.88

However, as time went on the relationship between

Guatemala and the United States waned. During the Carter administration, foreign aid required
that the receiving nation was not committing human rights abuses to receive the aid package.
Given that Guatemala was in the throes of a civil war and was in the beginning states of a
genocide, and thus the United States discontinued aid to Guatemala. The United States attempted
to use foreign aid as a bargaining chip to influence negotiations across Guatemala. Instead of
allowing the United States to use their money and military aid to impact negotiations, Guatemala
eliminated their need for the United States by finding other countries to support their cause.
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Guatemala avoided purchasing arms from the United States and instead purchased arms from the
allies of the United States like South Korea and Israel.89 As Guatemala attempted to subvert US
power, they became less of an ally in the region and the United States more heavily relied on El
Salvador.
After the Carter Administration, the US policy towards foreign aid to Guatemala shifted
with President Reagan. Guatemala housed 226 million dollars in United States private
investments in industry, nickel and oil.90 The amount of private US investment in Guatemala was
double the amount of investment in El Salvador. Therefore, to protect US economic interests,
President Reagan eliminated the human rights obligations to foreign aid, and restored economic
and military aid to Guatemala. One of the ways that President Reagan could reverse this policy
was in the way that he framed those who were dying in Guatemala. When he described those
being killed as terrorists with Cuban and Soviet backing, there was no longer an incentive to see
those deaths as human rights violations. Instead they were perceived as necessary and justified
killings to restore democracy in Guatemala, and to bring an end to communism. In 1983, the
arms embargo against Guatemala was lifted, and full aid was restored to Guatemala in 1984.91
Although the United States resumed aid to Guatemala, Guatemala remained neutral when it came
to the United States attempting to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Overall these
economic policies would create the conditions for structural poverty that would exacerbate the
violence that would occur during the civil wars in these countries.
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Economic Inequality as A Push Factor
One of the causes behind increased migration from the Global South to the Global North
is the concentration of capital and employment in the Global North.92
Figure 2 GDP in US Dollars93
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According to the World Bank GDP Data

Figure 3 Average GINI Coefficient 1960-2016
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Honduras

47.6

54.8
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Economic inequality - GINI (19602016)
According to the World Bank Gini Data

Historically these countries have had large efforts to improve the state of the economy,
but those have traditionally failed to drastically increase their economic plight. Through the data
we can see that GDP has been steadily on the rise for El Salvador and Honduras, but they still
fall behind Guatemala economically. Given Honduras’ weak economic performance, migrating
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due to lack of economic opportunity is the most plausible rationale for migration. Between 1961
and 1965 the United States invested 200 million dollars in Honduras. The entire gross national
product of Honduras was 500 million at the time. United States-based companies owned the two
largest commercial banks, banana industry, the largest mining corporation, and a majority of the
infrastructure in Honduras94. While this was not the direct cause of economic collapse in
Honduras, the lack of Honduran control of the economy did inhibit their ability to repair their
economy. Additionally, when the conflict in Honduras was unceasing, foreign investors were no
longer willing to invest in such a conflict-ridden country.95 Furthermore, the amount of trade
decreased between Honduras and other nations due to the depressed prices of agricultural
products, especially in the wake of the second oil shock that drastically reduced trade due to the
rising cost of petroleum.96 Decreased international trade was coupled with the reduction of
intraregional trade, which had collapsed due to conflict. Foreign debt and interest’s payments
were beginning to approach their repayment period in conjunction with reduced economic aid
from the United States. Impacts of the economic crisis were mostly felt by the poor in Honduras.
Previous economic growth prior to the economic collapse was not shared by the poor of
Honduras, and by 1982, 81 percent of the population was still classified as extremely poor.97
The lack of social mobility in Honduras contributed to a wave of migration to the United
States in search of economic opportunity. Prior to the 1990’s most of Honduran migration was
internal migration. Hondurans were more likely to move from a rural to urban city to find work
than they were to migrate to the United States.98 Although in the 1990’s there were a myriad of
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economic shocks that impacted the Honduran economy, and those economic shocks were even
more devastating when combined with the impact of Hurricane Mitch.99 This was further
compounded by the extreme price volatility of the coffee industry which was no longer
controlled after the ICA was ended.100 Therefore given the lack of economic opportunity in
Honduras, people were incentivized to migrate in hopes of improving their economic situation.
While the economies of Guatemala and El Salvador were not prosperous, most of the
people who migrated from these countries did not cite economic inequality as a reason. El
Salvador had significant fiscal reform during this time, but the migration did not stem from the
success or failure of these new policies. The fiscal reform of the 1980’s had a lasting impact on
El Salvador’s economy. Under the junta rule, the armed forces assisted in the reclamation of
large private property, which coincided with their programs to provide for the citizens basic
needs as a ruse to violently repress the strikes occurring against the government.101 Overall El
Salvador was executing an expansionary monetary policy, that they were not able to afford, but
with the constant stream of loans from the International Monetary Fund and foreign aid from the
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United States El Salvador was able to reduce their deficit and make positive economic reforms
for business interests that did not lead to positive effects for the people.102103
The economic plight of the Guatemalan people was merely a secondary reason to migrate
to the United States. Most of the migrants who came from Guatemala were indigenous Mayans,
who had been below the poverty line for hundreds of years. Guatemala has historically suffered
from long term and widespread economic inequality due to factors of unequal land distribution,
lack of educational access, and lack of government policy to address the issues of social
inequality.104 Guatemala is currently ranked as a mid-range company based on GDP, but has the
highest incident of poverty than any other Central American country.105 Instead of attempting to
promote policy to address the issues of social inequality in the nation, Guatemalan officials have
emphasized appeasing the interests of the economic elite and foreign entities through lenient
economic policy. Guatemala is a tax-free haven, and as such the United States had a vested
interest in maintaining that policy for the growth of the US economy. As the United States
imported a variety of agricultural products from Central America the tax-free haven was
beneficial to private enterprise in the United States.106 However, upon the signing of the Peace
Accords that ended the war, many Guatemalans felt there was no other choice but to migrate to
the United States in hope for a better future. The Peace Accords did not punish those who
committed human rights violations for the past 36 years, and further solidified the control of the
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transitional elite of economic policy in Guatemala.107 Therefore, given the lack of job prospects
and chances for upward mobility, coupled with the unpunished human rights violations, many
Guatemalans fled their country.
According to Figure 1, the data illustrates that over time the GDP of each country has
increased, although at varying levels. Overall as shown in Figure 2, despite variances in the
GDP, the level of inequality remains similar across each of the cases. Thus, the data suggests that
due to economic inequality there will always be a stream of migration from Central America to
the United States in search of increased and better economic opportunity. However, given the
similarity in GINI coefficients economic inequality as a push factor cannot explain the spikes in
migration from these nations to the United States. Therefore, the data indicates that overall
economic inequality cannot explain the differences in rate of migration from each of the cases,
which means that it is a secondary reason for migration.
This hypothesis has tenuous support depending on the case study. For example, in the
context of the Guatemala and El Salvador during their civil wars it is difficult to determine if a
person chose to migrate due to violence or if lack of economic opportunity. Figure 1 and Figure
2 do support the idea that there is a lack of economic opportunity in each of the case studies, but
it does not necessarily correlate to increased migration. The migration seen from Honduras could
prove that lack of economic opportunity leads to an increase in migration during the period of the
civil wars surrounding their nation, but there is not enough evidence to prove there is a direct
correlation. However, the amount of migration did directly increase shortly after Hurricane
Mitch. According to a 2011 Pew Research Center Survey Central American migrant – 83% of
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whom were born in the Northern Triangle – were less likely than other Latino migrants (46% vs.
58%) to cite economic opportunities as the main reason for relocating to the U.S. In addition, a
smaller share of Central American immigrants cited family reasons for migrating (18% vs. 24%
among other Hispanic immigrants). Surveys of recently deported Northern Triangle migrants in
their home countries 1 also found that work was a top motivator for their journey, according to a
Pew Research Center analysis of 2016 data. Among Guatemalans deported from the U.S., 91%
cited work as a main reason for coming, as did 96% of Hondurans deported from the U.S. and
97% of deported Salvadorans.108 Therefore there are economic reasons that people from Central
America do migrate to the United States, but there is not enough evidence to support that
economic reasons are the main impetus for migration to the United States.
The second independent variable was the economic inequality in Central America. I
ultimately conclude that rather than people migrating due to economic inequality from the 19601980’s, economic inequality was a factor in how much the violence was able to escalate in the
region. The creation of the banana republics ultimately allowed for unequal distributions of
power, that led to the creation of authoritarian and military dictatorships. The lack of legitimate
democracy in these countries tied with the communist influence that perturbed the United States
allowed for the civil wars to happen, and simultaneously the violence to escalate to especially
regarding the poor indigenous populations in Guatemala. However, when looking at the post
Hurricane Mitch migration, economic inequality due to the destroyed economy/homes was the
main driver of migration to the United States. The current surge of migration is mostly due to the
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high rates of crime, but economic inequality means that people turn to crime to support their
families and thus it is a contributing factor to migration to the United States.
Violence as A Push Factor
Figure 4 Number of Battle Related Deaths at Peak of Conflict and Migration Rates
El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Number of immigrants entering US
(1990)

80,173

32,303

12,024

Battle-related deaths (1989)

6,800

500

n/a

One of the primary contributors to migration to the United States from Central America
was the violence happening in the region. One of the similarities between the civil wars in El
Salvador and Guatemala is that they both had killing squads. For example, in Guatemala the
Guatemalan army destroyed more than 400 Maya villages between 1982 and 1983, sending
refugees fleeing north into southern Mexico and the United States.109 Additionally, it is estimated
that the civil war in Guatemala resulted in: “some 200,000 persons killed, 35,000 to 40,000
disappeared (the highest in any country in Latin America), 150,000 to 200,000 refugees in
Mexico alone, and an estimated 1 million people displaced internally, which is roughly half the
entire Central American total”.110 111One unique aspect of the Guatemalan civil war was that it
lasted from 1962 until 1996, which was much longer than the civil war in El Salvador. However,
even though the civil war lasted for over thirty years, the uptick in migration did not truly start to
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be noticeable until 1981.112 One of the consequences of the violence was the number of displaced
persons due to the various military campaigns pursued by the armed forces at the time. In
Guatemala, because of the scorched earth campaigns it is estimated that 1.5 million people were
displaced.
The progression of violence in Guatemala increased rapidly as leaders wanted to finish
the war. Originally there was only one rebel group the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, but soon after
three more rebel groups were created in Guatemala. To defeat the rebels, the United States had
Guatemala focus on the internal enemy, which was broadly defined as anyone who might be
sympathetic to communist ideology. This framing stemmed from the idea that Guatemala was
more likely to face pressure to transition to communism from the lower classes than states like
Cuba and the Soviet Union. President Carter stopped providing aid to Guatemala due to the
concern of human rights abuses. Therefore, when President Reagan came into power it was
unlikely that Congress would support reinstating aid into the country. Instead President Reagan
had soft aid brought into Guatemala through various US private organizations.113
By the 1980’s the Guatemalan government realized that they needed to increase their
efforts to finally defeat the rebels. Massive systematic violence was used to decrease the
connection between guerrillas and the rural Guatemalans that supported the guerillas. The
Guatemalan army proceeded to adopt the “scorched earth” approach, were they would burn
villages to the ground and eliminate entire regions of any form of life.114 Armed forces had two
approaches to violence: selective killing and indiscriminate killing. Selective killing was mostly
committed by death squads who made it their mission to eliminate local leaders who supported
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communism, however the indiscriminate killing occurred when the armed forces identified that
an entire region would be sympathetic to communist ideology. Thus, the violence level reached
over 200,000 people, and 93% of the violence was committed by state actors. Approximately
500,000 people were displaced because their entire community was destroyed by indiscriminate
violence.115 The systematic violence was the main push factor for the people of Guatemala to
migrate to the United States.
However, Guatemala is distinct from El Salvador in that violence is endemic to
Guatemala. Since colonial rule Guatemala has been in a perpetual cycle of violence, especially
violence towards indigenous populations.116 The first cycle of violence stems from the collision
of anti-communist elites in Guatemala, and the guerilla forces in Guatemala. In response to the
rise of procommunist guerilla forces in Guatemala, the economic elites and armed forces
combined forces to form paramilitary death squads. At that point, the violence in Guatemala was
shifting from a civil war to the start of a genocide.117 Shifts from conventional warfare to
genocide can be seen distinctly through the second cycle of violence in Guatemala. In response
to the 1976 earthquake, indigenous folks who were impacted the hardest banded together to be a
conduit for international aid. Since the earthquake mostly impacted the poor in Guatemala, it
offered a unique instance of class consciousness that could have inspired all the poor to rally
together to fight the systematic injustice they were facing. Once the Guatemalan government
realized this there was a resulting massive repression effort made by the government from
targeted killing to general terror campaigns against their people.118
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According to the Political Instability Task Force despite not having the same quantity of
numbers as the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, the civil war in El Salvador should be
classified as a genocide. The National Army of El Salvador was committed to eliminating
anyone who as not working with them to accomplish their agenda, and thus leftist’s
organizations and the supporters were the targets during the civil war in El Salvador.119 There
were 152 documented massacres in El Salvador during the civil war, and the official numbers as
of this point cannot be confirmed due to suppression of journalists during the civil war.120 As of
now the estimates state that 75,000 people were massacred during this time due to the death
squads, bombings, and various terrorist tactics. In El Salvador, state-sponsored violence during
the civil war led to the displacement of 500,000 people.121122
El Salvador and Guatemala were known for the death squad that existed during their civil
wars, but it is often not known that Honduras also had death squads at the same time of the civil
wars occurring in Guatemala and El Salvador. Between 1980 and 1984 the Honduras military
worked with support from the United States to uncover and destroy the guerilla movement in
Honduras.123 Those who were found out to be supporters of the guerilla movement (or
Sandinista/Marti supporters) were not afforded lawyers or trials. Instead they were subject to the
death squads, most famously Battalion 3-16. Persons who were identified as enemies of the state
“disappeared”, and to date there are no official numbers on how many were killed by these
Hondurans death squads.124
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While El Salvador did not necessarily face the same general terror campaigns, the logic
for migration was similar between Guatemala and El Salvador. The decision of whether to
migrate to escape violence followed this line of logic, “if the potential utility of any destination
area exceeds actual utility in the origin area, migration occurs.” There are a variety of other
mitigating factors that motivate migration like: cost of migration, distance to target location, and
loss of cultural community. Despite the challenges that stem from deciding to migrate, ultimately
individuals wanted to eliminate the possibility of being targets of state violence. When
Guatemala and El Salvador were assassinating targets, there was low incentive for people to
migrate, because they assumed that they would not be the targets of the violence. Once the
transition was made from targeted violence to general terror campaigns the incentive to migrate
increased, because there was no way to protect yourself from randomly occurring violence.125
Honduras is different from these two cases in so far as it did not have a civil war.
However, despite not having a civil war there was still violence that crossed over into the
Honduran borders. For example, dozens of Hondurans were tortured and kidnapped during the
conflict, but there was not a significant enough portion of the population impacted to have
triggered the rise in migration.126Therefore, violence be the main motivating factor for migration
from El Salvador and Guatemala, but does not explain why people from Honduras migrated to
the United States.
When looking at the migration rates of each of the case studies there is a clear spike
around 1990, which is the year after the highest rates of battle deaths in each of the conflicts. In
El Salvador the number of migrants in 1988 was 12,045, and increased by over 60,000 in one
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year is an example of how the levels of violence increasing drastically escalates the rate of
migration. El Salvador had the highest rates of migration in comparison to Guatemala and
Honduras due to having the highest amount of violence. Honduras had average rates of migration
due to the lack of official civil war happening in their country, and as a result the migration was
increased but not at the rate of El Salvador. This data cements the conclusion that violence is a
greater push factor than economic inequality.
Conclusion
The United States has created a system that ensures Central America is dependent on the
United States to sustain their economy, which has allowed the US to exert control over Central
America for centuries (Lafarber, 18). The United States was often entangled in Central American
conflict due to economic investments and military support of the conflict in Central America to
maintain their interests, instead of attempting to restore stability to the region (Lafarber, 39).
Despite the US anti-communist influence, the rise of leftist politics took hold in Central America,
primarily because a majority of the population felt disenfranchised politically/economically and
thus were willing to reorient their politics to gain power.
After decades of civil war conflict spilling across border lines, egregious human rights
violations, and a system of structural poverty led to forced migration in Central America
(Bradley, 84). The tactics used during the civil wars, liked scorched earth military campaigns,
forcibly displaced a large swath of Central Americans during and after the civil wars. It often
took a decade or longer to find a solution to the forced displacement for most Central Americans,
and often these solutions produced lackluster if not terrible solutions for those who were
attempting to flee the problems their country faced. Significant scholarship has been produced on
the question of motivating factors for migration, and the consensus is that dual credence must be
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given to political and economic motivations for migration.127 Due to the United States propping
up various regimes in Central America, there has been an increased migration in Central
American countries to the United States. Additionally, despite Honduras being the third largest
sender of immigrants to the United States, there is no existing literature that speaks to the cause
of this migration to the United States.
Attempting to escape from violence is the main push factor from people migrating from
Central America. Individuals generally did not migrate when the violence was contained to
targeted killings, but when the armed forces decided to go on campaigns of general terror the
incentive to migrate increased. The incentive increased because they could no longer attempt to
avoid violence, because the decisions behind who was killed could not be predicted. Another
push factor that influenced migration was the economic decline from the continuing conflict in
the region. Central Americans lost their jobs, homes, and were victims of exacerbated structural
economic inequality due to the civil war. Finally, despite being one of the largest sector of
migrants from Central America, there has been little research done on the rationale behind
migration from Honduras. Based on the research that does exist, one can extrapolate that the
economic decline and influx of members of the guerillas/armed forces from Nicaragua,
Guatemala, and El Salvador has caused a displacement of Hondurans in addition to lack of job
prospects in the nation.
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Chapter Two: Migration Pull Factors from Central America to the United States
Introduction
Although the United States was founded by immigrants, immigration policy in the United
States has not always favored increased immigration. US immigration policy throughout history
has been created to solve two problems, narrowly defining who can gain citizenship and who can
enter the country.128 Immigration policy throughout America’s history has been created to ensure
that Western Europe can come to the United States, whereas other areas of the world have had to
earn their ability to come to the United States through the passage of new immigration policy.
As stated in the previous chapter, the violence and poverty caused by US policy in
Central America were the major factors that pushed the Central American people out of their
countries in addition to the natural disasters that devastated the areas. However, these push
factors were met by pull factors from the United States in the context of the labor demands of the
United States. While the United States had primarily placed Latino immigrants in agricultural
jobs, the downward spiral of the US economy necessitated an increase labor demand for lowwage workers in blue collar jobs and the service industry. As the Bracero program had ended (in
addition to the new immigration cap placed on immigrants from the Western Hemisphere), the
workers who migrated from Central America were no longer seasonal laborers but rather
permanent residence without any avenue to obtain a legal resident status.129 This is only one of
the ways in which policy created by the United States has varying impacts on populations
attempting to migrate to the United States.130
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There was increased migration to the United States by the people of Central America
following the wave of violence caused by the civil wars that rampaged through the region. As the
violence increased, the economy subsequently declined which only further spurred immigration
to the United States. Nicaragua was the only country whose immigrants had a pathway to legal
permanent residence, as the people were fleeing a leftist regime and was granted leeway by the
United States. In contrast undocumented Salvadoran, Guatemalans, and Hondurans remained
without a pathway to legal permanent residence, and accounted for the total undocumented
populations of 570,000, 430,000, and 300,000 respectively.131 The United States also allowed
immigration to the United States due to natural disasters destroying the infrastructure of Central
America. In this chapter I will analyze immigration policy from the Truman to Clinton
administration to explain how the determinants of who receives asylum is based on the political
affiliation of the Presidential administration and the political climate of the country the migrant is
fleeing from. I will also go on to analyze the differentiated degrees of asylum acceptance by the
United States to the migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Pre-Truman Immigration Policy
There were two major pieces of legislation that impacted immigration in the United
States in the early twentieth century. Quota systems for immigration were established through
the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and Immigration Act of 1924.132 The Emergency Quota Act
of 1921 set the current levels of immigration allowed from a country based on 3% of their
population in the US Census. Upon implementation of the bill, the United States government
could ensure that only predominantly immigrants from Western Europe were able to enter the
United States (given that they had the largest populations in the United States). Therefore, by
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only allowing 3% of current census levels, then most of Southern/Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa,
and Latin America were unable to enter the United States due to their low populations rates
during the previous census.133 Restrictions on immigration increased with the Immigration Act of
1924, because the quota was reduced from 3% to 2% and was based on numbers from the 1890
US Census instead of the 1910 US Census.134 While these laws did not generally impact
immigration from Central America, they do provide historical context that the United States has
been hesitant and often intent on restricting immigration from non- Western European countries.
Truman to Ford Immigration Policy
President Truman passed a plethora of monumental immigration reform during his
administration. He was dealing with the aftermath of WWII, and the early years of the Cold War
domination in Eastern Europe. As a result, immigration and refugee policy was a paramount
issue to resolve. His first major piece of legislation was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,
which he admitted had a myriad of discriminatory clauses embedded into the bill. The bill
provided for the admission of over 200,000 refugees over the next two years, but the bill was not
uniform in the criteria for who would be allowed to enter the United States. There were
provisions in the bill to reduce the amount of eligible Jewish refugees, and instead preferred to
accept refugees from people seeking refuge form communist controlled countries.135 President
Truman was reluctant to sign this legislation, but later could sign the Displaced Persons Act of
1952 which eliminated the discriminatory clauses in the previous legislation. While now the
legislation was not assisting Central American migration, it was setting the precedent for how the
United States was going to create asylum policy towards refugees.
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Another pivotal piece of legislation to the migration of the Central American people was
the McCarran-Walter Act, which outlined the types of people that were granted entry into the
country. The law outlined that only a skilled immigrant (or someone who could prove their
relationship to a person already in the United States), average immigrants, and refugees.
Ultimately Truman vetoed the bill, but was overridden by 2/3 of Congress and thus it passed.136
Truman’s misgivings on the bill were rooted in the fact that it still kept the national quota system
despite its continued discrimination to certain populations.137
This act was an attempt to reconcile all of the laws, executive orders, proclamations,
rules, regulations, operation instructions, and treaties on immigration in the United States at the
time. Thus, after all of the reports and hearings were compiled, the omnibus bill was made to
create a cohesive legislative understanding of immigration.138 The Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 did maintain the quota system in an attempt to restrict the flows of immigration
while also trying to ensure that racial composition of the United States remained the same.139
However, despite retaining the quota system it did have lasting impacts on Central American
migration. Migration from the Western Hemisphere still was not under the quota system, but
given that it codified all previous immigration legislation it provided clear guidelines for under
what circumstances someone could migrate to the United States.140141 While this policy was
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created before the people of Central America needed to migrate to the United States, by
providing provisions of blood relation it would allow future migrants to the United States entry
given existing family networks in the United States. Therefore, there was incentive to migrate to
the United States given that the lack of quota system did allow significant amounts of migrants to
come to the United States to establish themselves.
During the Eisenhower Era around 300,000 people were admitted to the United States,
and he relaxed security measures on refugees and escapees attempting to enter the United States
.142 One of the interesting dynamics of the Eisenhower administration was that he did not pass
comprehensive refugee admissions policy, and instead worked to create individual instances of
legislation based on the conflicts happening in an area. This tactic would ultimately be
implemented by later administrations to the disadvantage of Central American migrants. Instead
of passing a unified definition of what constitutes grounds for asylum or refugee protections, the
United States could cherry-pick which conflicts would have people be categorized as economic
or political refugees based on the political ideology of the country they were fleeing. Thus, a
majority of Central Americans would later be initially denied access to the United States based
on precedent of the Eisenhower administration.143
During his administration President Eisenhower creates three different pieces of
legislation in the context of refugee migration. In 1954, President Eisenhower creates the
Refugee Relief Act, which allows people from communist countries in Europe to enter the
United States. He passes the Refugee Escapee Act in 1957, which provides a route of escape to
refugees from communist countries in the Middle East. His legislation reinforces he idea that the
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United States can only accept refugees from countries who do not share our same political
ideology, and the United States should continue to prioritize the interests of those fleeing
communist countries.
Despite his desire to pass immigration reform given his family background, President
Kennedy given his early demise was unable to pass immigration reform. However, despite his
lack of legislative accomplishments, his book the Nation of Immigrants was instrumental to
creating momentum to reform immigration policy. The Civil Rights movements focus on
eliminating discrimination incentivized eliminating the discriminatory provisions in the
McCarran Walter Act with the quota system. He did create a proposal that was sent to Congress
on July 23, 1963 that the national quota system should be eliminated. Committee hearings on the
bill were delayed until 1964, but ultimately President Johnson proceeded to attempt to eliminate
the national quota system.144
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act) would change the quota
system that the United States used. Thus, instead of having a quota of immigrants that could be
let in from each country, the system was revolutionized by stating that there would be a total of
300,000 visas issued a year on a first come first serve basis that will not consider the nation of
origin/race of the applicant. One caveat to the bill was that there was an unlimited amount of
family reunification visas.145 There were additional provisions to eliminate discriminatory
clauses related to race in previous instances of immigration reform. Although these measures

144
145

Kennedy, 137
Jaggers, Gabbers, and Jaggers, 8

58

were beneficial to future waves of immigrants, those were not the provisions that had the greatest
impacts on migrants from Central America.146
However, one of the biggest impacts of this bill was the cap that was put on immigration
from the Western Hemisphere (which did not exist previously), and later complicated the process
of Central Americans attempting to transition from undocumented to legal permanent residents
of the United States.147 The cap on migrants from the Western Hemisphere ensured that Central
Americans trying to receive visas were having to compete from migrants from all over Latin
America. One reason that this provision was not as devastating as it could have been being that
given that family connections were able to receive an unlimited number of visas, the chain
migration ensured that due to previous migrations more people were able to enter the United
States through family connections in the United States.148 However, migration during this
administration was still low given that the Guatemalan civil war had just started, and the civil
wars had not started in El Salvador. Thus, while this legislation would implicate Central
Americans, directly after passaging it was not an immediate detriment to the immigration process
for Central Americans.149
There were additional pieces of legislation that were passed as stop gaps for immigration
reform until the 1980 US Refugee Act. These instances of legislation were based on creating
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policies based on situations where refugees were fleeing political conditions or national disasters.
It was not until the 1980 passage of the US Refugee Act, that the United States would not decide
the refugee status of an application based on the nation of origin. Prior to 1980, the primary
group of refugees that were given asylum status were people fleeing the USSR in Eastern
Europe. This transition would ensure that applications for asylum would be evaluated on a case
by case basis, instead of being based on national qualifications.150
Nixon to Reagan Immigration Policy
The 1980 Refugee Act shifted their definition of refugee from the 1950’s interpretation of
a refuge as someone who can only gain protection if they are fleeing a certain country. The new
interpretation defines a refugee as, “any person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality, or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself to the protection of that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social, or political opinion.” One interesting caveat is that the fear of persecution was not defined
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but rather the legitimacy of the fear of
persecution claims were determined by the State Department who then advised the INS with
their asylum applications.
This minor detail would have enormous implications for the migrants of Central
America. Even though the US Department of State is filled with career diplomats, the Secretary
of State is appointed by the US President. Thus, the Secretary of State is the ultimate arbiter of
what political conditions constitute legitimate fear of persecution. Therefore, the Secretary of
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State based the legitimacy of these claims on the foreign policy objectives of the President. In the
context of Central America, this meant that later President Nixon and President Reagan would
not classify the conflicts occurring in El Salvador and Guatemala as legitimate basis for fear of
persecution, because the United States was aligned with the rightist governments who were
committing human rights violations against the people of these nations. Nicaraguans were
primarily awarded asylum based on ‘fear of persecution’ because the United States was
attempting to eliminate the leftist regime, and by supporting the Nicaraguan claims would not
showcase the illegitimacy of US Presence and efforts in Central America. If President Nixon or
President Reagan would have admitted a significant amount of people from people fleeing
rightist regimes like the people from El Salvador and Guatemala were, they would have had to
justify their presence and would have to withdraw early.
In the 1980’s there was a shift in the process of asylum in the United States. Previously the
nation of origin determined the asylum status of an applicant, however this was transitioned
instead to having the applications looked at individually instead of simply based on the nation of
origin. The shift in policy changed the entire application process, which the Reagan
administration was not prepared for. The infrastructure to have case by case assessments of
asylum was beyond the scope of the resources that existed for the Reagan administration.151 In
addition to the Reagan administration not having the funds to support the adjudication of asylum
on a case by case basis, the lack of national origin ensured that Salvadorans were no longer able
to get considered as a national group for asylum status.
Upon losing the ability to determine who receives asylum based on nation of origin,
President Reagan could frame the Salvadorans as merely economic migrants, instead of people
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fleeing systematic violence. He was unable to grant them amnesty status, because he was funding
and supporting the repressive government that was causing Salvadorans to flee. He reframed the
conversation around Salvadorans as a people who could not receive asylum, but rather we should
invest more into the war in El Salvador. By investing more in the war, it would provide a stable
state for the Salvadorans, which would be a better alternative than seeking asylum in the United
States.152 He used these same types of framing tactics to ensure that Guatemalans were unable to
gain asylum status. However, in comparison Hondurans were unable to gain asylum and were
deported at above average rates, because since there was not state sponsored violence occurring
in Honduras there was no justification for Hondurans to gain asylum status.
One of the problems with this system was the disparity between application acceptance rates.
For example, there was a 70% approval rate for people fleeing the Soviet Union, and in contrast
only 2% of refugee applications were accepted for Salvadorians, Haitians, Guatemalans, and
Hondurans. Thus, President Reagan sent the message that those fleeing communism were
welcome, but those who were impacted by right-wing governments were not welcome in the
United States.153 There was a systematic refusal to allow those who were fleeing violence from
Central America the change to receive asylum, and have an opportunity to escape the violence in
their home nation.154155156

152

Macekura, 2011
Hamlin, 43
154
Zolberg, 1998
155
Nearly 70% of those accepted into the general amnesty program were Mexican; more than 20% were from
Central America and the Caribbean. Their acceptance stemmed from their utility to the seasonal agricultural
program, but it was a viable avenue to achieve amnesty. (Perry, 2014).
156
At this point I will incorporate the official asylum application data from the UNCHR and the Annual report of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service created by the U.S. Dept. of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
I just did not have access to SPSS over the break, and was unable to do it this week. The data will show the number
of applications and the acceptance rate of applications in my case study countries.
153

62

One of the interesting outcomes of the 1980 US Refugee Act, was that it worked to create the
Sanctuary Movement in the United States. Based on the criteria in the 1980 Refugee Act,
churches all around the United States determined that those attempting to flee Central America
met those criteria and thus deserved protection as they were fleeing their home countries to the
United States.157 While the movement was primarily coordinated by religious organizations, they
did work with non-secular organizations to maximize their resources and abilities to help
refugees.158 This movement was created a s direct response to the Central American refugees
being denied asylum by the United States, because they were fleeing rightist governments
instead of the communist governments that the administration sympathized with.159160The
Sanctuary Movement has created a process to differentiate between economic and political
refugees though a screening process, because given the limited resources they can only help
political refugees from Central America.161162163 This vetting process of the refugees was a direct
challenge to the rhetoric of President Reagan, who claimed that everyone from El Salvador and
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Guatemala Were merely economic refugees. By investigating those fleeing before they entered
the United States, it ensured that the Sanctuary movement could provide concrete evidence that
these people were fleeing from violence and not merely decades of economic policy by the
United States that placed them in structural poverty.
While the Sanctuary Movement had minimal resources, they could push for significant reforms
in the asylum/refugee process for Central Americans. United States citizens were creating an
Underground Railroad for Central Americans, and often were willing to face legal consequences
for their actions. These legal disputes created precedent that forced the United States to
reevaluate asylum claims of Central Americans who were previously denied asylum.164 There
were three court cases in particular that worked to reverse the asylum denial for the refugees of
El Salvador and Guatemala: Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, Orantes-Hernandez et. al. v. Richard
Thornburgh, and American Baptist Churches et. al. v. Richard Thornburgh et. al. The OrantesHernandez v. Meese case established through studies that there were human rights violations
occurring in El Salvador by the Salvadoran government which warranted the protection of the
Salvadoran refugees. The Orantes-Hernandez et. al. v. Richard Thornburgh cases decided that all
the Salvadoran detainees had the right to apply for political asylum and they must be provided
with the option to contact legal representation. Finally, the American Baptist Churches et. al. v.
Richard Thornburgh et. al. case was a class action lawsuit that spanned the nation, which
established that the Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applications should be reconsidered
given the concrete evidence of human rights violations occurring in their countries. All the court
cases were a direct result of the assistance of the Sanctuary Movement, and ensured that the
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asylum applicants were truly being looked at as political refugees instead of economic refugees.
The legal precedent set helped provide justices to a plethora of asylum seekers, and ensure that
they would not be forced to return to their countries and experience the violence happening
during the civil wars.
Conclusion
Immigration policy in the United States has always been dictated by the political
administration, and the administration has determined who deserved the right to gain
entry/citizenship into the United States. Given the politicized nature of immigration policy, it
only seems to reason that the creation of policy would stem from the political climate of the time.
Despite the politicized nature of immigration policy, the United States being brought into
compliance with international law in the context of refugee protection with the creation of the
1980 Refugee Act. However, the implementation of the 1980 Refugee Act heralded back to
discriminatory practices of past immigration law. The United States did not have comprehensive
immigration policy, which then allowed Presidential administrations to decide who should
receive asylum based on their political objectives. This system ensured that presidents from
Eisenhower to Reagan could prioritize refugees from Communist countries, instead of also
allowing refugees from war torn countries entry into the United States. The president could
define what constituted legitimate ‘fear of persecution’, and subsequently decided that those
fleeing rightist governments did not meet the criteria necessary to justify that they should receive
asylum.
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Chapter Three Migration from Central America to the United States 1989-Present
Introduction
While the push factors of violence and economic inequality remain the same as the
previous chapter, the arbiters of said push factors changed greatly. For example, US domestic
immigration policy led to the deportation of gang members to Central America, which has
escalated the violence happening across the region. While jobs in the region have still been based
in agriculture, a series of natural disasters have greatly reduced economic opportunity in the
region. Thus, this chapter will focus on how migration changes when it is a violent non-state
actor, and how economic situations change after a natural disaster.
US Foreign Policy Towards Central America 1990-Present
When the transition from the Reagan administration to the H.W. Bush administration
occurred, people were anticipating major shifts in US policy towards Central America. President
Reagan gave military aid to maintain strong holds in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras;
while attempting to ensure that he could get control of Nicaragua once more.165 In the context of
El Salvador, the United States was unable to retain power. Two months after the inauguration of
President George H.W. Bush, El Salvador elected Alfredo Cristiani, who was a leader of the farright party and eventually eliminated the Social Democrat Party. The main fear of the United
States if the ARENA party was in power was that there would be a continuation and
endorsement of the death squads that never truly stopped after the war, and thus the United
States attempted to negotiate with El Salvador by ending military aid and working towards
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human rights but ultimately failed.166 President George H.W. Bush was primarily concerned with
Nicaragua and El Salvador, and did not create major policy on Honduras or Guatemala. Overall
since the signing of the peace accords the United States has provided financial aid to the region,
but has not had major foreign policy initiatives absent condemning lack of democratic reform
and cartel violence.
The United States continued pushing for reform in the region, but in fact the first steps
for peace was made by the countries embroiled in war themselves. The Esquipula Peace
Agreements was an agreement signed by the leaders of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Costa Rica to work together to bring about peace in the region. The agreement had a variety of
goals such as:
“To take up fully the historical challenge of forging a peaceful destiny for
Central America;
To commit ourselves to the struggle for peace and the elimination of war)
To make dialogue prevail over violence and reason over hatred)
To dedicate these peace efforts to the young people of Central America whose
legitimate aspirations to peace and social justice, freedom and reconciliation have
been frustrated for many generations)
To take the Central American parliament as the symbol of the freedom and
independence of the reconciliation to which we aspire in Central America.
We ask the international community to respect and assist our efforts. We have
our own approaches to peace and development but we need help in making them a
reality. We ask for an international response which will guarantee development so
that the peace we are seeking can be a lasting one. We reiterate firmly that peace
and development are inseparable.”
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The Esquipula Accords attempted to set up a framework for the nations to prevent war
from starting again. There were processes to attempt reconciliation, and included a commitment
to deal with the plethora of refugees who were dealing with the aftermath of the conflicts.
Finally, the Esquipula wanted to ensure that they could work towards free elections and authentic
democracies.167 168 At the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Esquipula Accords it was
noted that this agreement was the first step in demilitarizing the region and taking autonomy
back from the United States. While that agreement spurred the subsequent national peace accords
across the isthmus, ultimately it was not strong enough to spur the structural changes needed to
create long term solutions to the inequality and lack of infrastructure in the region.169
The actual peace process varied for each nation. For example, there has not been an
official reconciliation or peace accords for Honduras, given that they did not have a traditional
civil war. However, those who were involved with the Battalion 3-16 gave testimonies to court
officials. For example, Florencio Caballero testified in 1987 to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the Senate Intelligence Committee about the actions of torture, kidnapping,
and murder committed by Battalion 316. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also in
1993 heard the testimonies of former Battalion 316 members who were able to provide
information on 180 disappearances.170 Overall there have been a series of court cases that have
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prosecuted some of the people involved in the Battalion 316 for their portion in the
disappearances and torture of the Honduran people. However, there has not been an overarching
move for accountability for the human rights abuses, and some of the prosecutions have merely
resulted in protection through amnesty law. Although in 2004, President Maduro did accept
responsibility on behalf of the Honduran government for human rights abuses in the 1980’s,
while promising to work with international legal organizations to provide accountability.171
The following progress has been made in the context of justice restoration for the families
of victims and healing of the nation. Payments of the 2.1 million dollars of reparations were
promised to the families of the 184 acknowledged victims in the previous testimonies were to
start in 2000, but they were only promised to the families of 19 of the 184 known cases of human
rights abuses. In 2003, Salavar Mesa was convicted of illegal detention and sentenced to four
years in jail. Prior to this the cases concerning officers were charged, but claimed immunity
under amnesty laws to prevent punishment. There are still pending cases, but the process of
justice has been slow moving in Honduras (especially after the 2009 coup).172
In contrast to the slow process of justice occurring in Honduras, Guatemala and El
Salvador preceded to negotiate their own peace accords as an attempt end the violence in the
region. El Salvador and Guatemala were similar in that in addition to negotiating a peace treaty
they did create a Truth and Reconciliation process. The TRC’s were able to help people find
answers about the atrocities that occurred during the civil war, but did not structurally change
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people’s desire for revenge. This was mostly due to the lack of change infrastructure to resolve
economic inequality, which was a major factor in the conflict.173 After the peace accords the
United States shifted focus to other conflicts as Central America was no longer a battleground
for the Cold War. US foreign policy primarily consisted of attempting to maintain peace and
perpetual condemnation of gang violence.
However, in spite of the US changing their focus, El Salvador and Guatemala continue
their efforts to restore peace in their nation. In El Salvador, there were five main issues that had
to be resolved by the peace accords: human rights with an international Truth Commission to
investigate and redress the abuses of the past 12 years; (2) demilitarization, including a phased
relinquishing of arms by the FMLN as well as reform and reduction of the armed forces; (3)
police reform, replacing the old police and security apparatus with a new Civilian National
Police; (4) judicial reform, which would overhaul the Supreme Court and establish a Human
Rights Ombudsman office, and (5) land reform and other economic and social issues. 174 Overall
despite the efforts of El Salvador to gain legitimacy through the peace process the failed
implementation of the Truth Commission implicated the ability for El Salvador to create the
conditions of a stable democracy.175 Implementation of the demilitarization and police reform
had mixed results, where the military units (death squads) were just renamed and transferred to
the armed forces and national police forces. Additionally, the judicial reform did not hold people
responsible for the atrocities committed during the civil war, which hindered the consolidation of
democratization. Finally, the lack of land reform allowed for the continuation of systematic
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poverty, which recreated the same socioeconomic conditions that spurred the violence in the civil
war. Thus, while the peace accords of El Salvador held promise, they ultimately did not lead to
the reformations of society necessary to fully resolve the consequences of the conflict. 176
In Guatemala the peace process shad slightly, different outcomes than El Salvador.
Similar to El Salvador, there was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission implemented as a
result of the Guatemalan Peace Accords. However, the Guatemalan Peace Accords refused to
name those who responsible for the human rights violations, and also refused to prosecute
anyone found related to the human rights violations committed during the civil war. The accords
also did not resolve that socioeconomic issues that were the main causes behind the creation of
the Guatemalan civil war. Although despite the shortcomings of the Guatemalan Peace Accords,
they did end the cycle of violence caused by the permeation of Cold War ideology in Central
America.177
Push Factor Violence
There has been a tremendous uptick in violence across the Northern Triangle, and its
roots can be traced to the gang culture that has roots in deported Central Americans and civil war
violence. When looking at the origins of gang violence in Central America, there are two main
gangs discussed in the literature: Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio-18. While there are additional
street/local gangs throughout El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras these two gangs remain the
main perpetrators of violence in Central America and beyond. The original members of MS-13
and Barrio 18 was composed of a collection of Salvadorian immigrants who settled in Los
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Angeles, who were forced to work together to survive the African American and Mexican gangs
who already existed in the area.178 As a result Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 were born, which
was equipped machetes, guns, and guerilla combat training due to their involvement with the
civil war.179 The primary distinction between the two gangs is that Mara Salvatrucha was
founded by Salvadoran refugees, whereas Barrio 18 was the creation of Mexicans in Los
Angeles that allowed other Hispanics to join its ranks. As the civil wars were ending in
Guatemala and El Salvador the United States started to take action against the growing threat of
violence from Central American gangs. The Immigration and Naturalization Services created the
Violent Gang Task Force, and their mission was to deport people (whether they had lawful
residence or were undocumented) if there was evidence that they had committed
felonies.180181182183
While gang violence has impacted Central America across the board, it has had different
implications for each country. For example, the gang culture in El Salvador was stronger than
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Salvatrucha or the Eighteenth Street Gang; only 15% of gang members belonged to other
gangs.46 A similar survey conducted in Honduras showed that MS-13 and the Eighteenth
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However, in terms of numbers, the share of gang members repatriated from the United
States was rather low. The survey in San Salvador revealed that 17% of active gang members
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other countries due to the increased training the gang members had from their experience in the
civil war and the ease of access of weapons from the civil war. El Salvador was the perfect
breeding grounds for gang culture as it was riddled with corruption, unemployment, and
firearms. 30,000 Salvadoran Armed Forces Soldiers, 6,400 National Police, and 8,500 other
combatants were demobilized after the Peace Accords, and Mara Salvatura capitalized on this by
adding them as new recruits.184 Furthermore the transplanted members of MS-13 from Los
Angeles were divorced from the culture of their communities, and thus were able to paint a
romanticized picture of gang life that enticed teens who were always desensitized to violence due
to the civil war.185 As a result of the power of the power of MS-13, El Salvador is in the top five
most violent countries in the world.186 As of 2016, San Salvador was the murder capital of the
world. El Salvador’s national homicide rate was 116 per 100,000, which is more than 17 times
the global average. Although unlike other Central American countries, the violence in EL
Salvador is primarily concentrated in four areas: San Salvador, La Libertad, Soyapango and
Usulutan.187
Figure 5 Rates of Migration, Homicide, and Asylum Acceptance Rate

Rate of migration
Violence - Homicide/100,000 - (19602016)
Asylum - Accepted Cases (2000-2016)

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Steadily increasing

Fluctuating

Steadily increasing

37.2 - 139.1
9,564 / 107,238
(8.9%)

24.2 - 45.1
10,992 / 91,063
(12.1%)

42.1 - 93.2
4,919 / 55,907 (8.8%)

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and World Bank Data
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As the Figure 4 indicates El Salvador has the highest rate of homicide across all three
countries, but an abysmal rate of acceptance of asylum. One of the problems with attempting to
obtain asylum is that the basis for application is fleeing from gang violence, and the United
States is hesitant to accept claims for asylum given that the amount of refugee applications
would drastically increase given the prevalence of gang violence worldwide. El Salvador and
Guatemala are similar in so far as a result of the civil war there has been a nationwide family
separation, low educational attainment, and endemic poverty. As a result gang recruitment is
high as a method to find a sense of family.188 Honduras did not experience a civil war, but it
suffers from the same low levels of educational attainment, poverty, and family disintegration
due to suppression of leftist descent.189 Honduras and El Salvador differ from Guatemala in so
far as there are high rates of extortion in these countries, which is used by the gangs to force
people to pay for protection and increases the power of the gang.190 In Guatemala, over half of
the population is under the age of 15 and as a result there is increased recruitment of youth for
gangs. Thus, we can see that the gangs exert large amounts of control over each country due to
the large number of gang members, and the high rates of violence cause people to want to flee
their homeland.
Push Factor Economic Inequality
Figure 6 GDP in US Dollars191
1990
1995
2000
2010
2015

El Salvador
4,801,000,000
9,501,000,000
13,134,000,000
21,418,000,000
26,052,000,000

Guatemala
7,650,000,000
14,655,000,000
19,289,000,000
41,339,000,000
63,768,000,000
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Honduras
3,049,000,000
3,911,000,000
7,104,000,000
9,627,000,000
20,844,000,000

Fogelbach, Juan J. 2011. "Gangs, Violence, and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras." San Diego
International Law Journal 12, no. 2:325-6
189
Fogelback, 426.
190
Folgelbach, 438
191
Data is collected by the World Banks

74

Economic inequality GINI (1992-2017)

El Salvador
46.7

Guatemala
54.8

Honduras
55.4

While violence due to pervasive gang culture is the main explanatory variable for people
migrating to the United States, there is still evidence that economic inequality is a contributing
factor to migration. Figure 6 shows that from 1980-2010 Central America as a whole has
increased their GDP growth, but that growth was not consistent or evenly distributed across the
region.192 However, Figure 7 shows that there has not been a radical difference in the GINI
coefficient, which substantiates the idea that there will be a steady stream of migration in hopes
of better economic opportunity but it cannot explain spikes in migration. There were clauses in
the each of the peace accords to improve the infrastructure and economic equality in the region,
but the provisions to ensure those clauses materialized never appeared. This was mostly due to
the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch.
In late October and early November of 1998 Hurricane Mitch hit Central America.
Hurricane Mitch killed approximately nine thousand people, while over three million people
were left homeless. It caused approximately five billion dollars’ worth of damage across the
region. Industries were devastated as Central America is mostly known for exporting agricultural
products. The banana industry had lost its crop for two seasons, and overseas companies started
to divest as a response to future economic losses. 193 All of this was just shortly after the peace
accords had been signed, and thus centralized economies were transformed into free markets,
and their economies spiraled. Furthermore, this devastated the chronically poor worse, as they
were living in shanty towns on the borders of plantations, which were swept away with rain from
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Hurricane Mitch. Thus, in response to this massive economic devastation the international
community decided to help Central America recover, and debts to foreign nations/organizations
were reduced or eliminated.194
In the status quo these nations are still trying to rebuild and stabilize their economies.
Every year they are hit with natural disasters, which impedes their ability to reach long term
economic stability. However, the biggest impediment is the lack of success in the poverty
reduction strategies across the region. The nations in Central America remains some of the most
unequal in terms of income distribution in the entire world. In Guatemala for example the entire
nation is dealing with issues of chronic poverty, but there is an even starker contrast in the
poverty faced by indigenous and non-indigenous people. Guatemala does not have the resources
of financial infrastructure to properly redistribute income to deal with ethnic divide in poverty
despite efforts by the government to increase financial assistance programs.195 In contrast,
Honduras has not attempted to create financial programs, and has instead cut social expenditure
spending and implemented a series of regressive taxes on its people. As a result, Honduras is the
most economically unequal nations in Central America and sixth most economically unequal
nations in the world.196 Therefore, there has been increased migration in light of low economic
mobility in Honduras. El Salvador has similar financial problems to the other two nations, but
the difference is how much El Salvador relies on remittances. Given the large population of
Salvadorans in the United States, their second largest source of money is from the remittances
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which will have to decrease in the face of new immigration policy.197 All of these nations have
experienced an increase in crime as people attempt to survive in destitution, and as a result more
people are migrating to the United States as a way to end their cycle of poverty.
While Hurricane Mitch devastated the entire region, some nations have been better at
recovery efforts than others. For example, when looking at the GDP of Guatemala in comparison
to El Salvador and Honduras the data illustrates that their GDP is around three times higher than
the other two. When looking at why their GDP is so much higher is mostly due to free trade
agreements and foreign investment have drastically improved the economy in combination with
a stable flow of remittances. However, despite the relatively stable economy there is low social
mobility in Guatemala. For example, in Guatemala if your parents did not receive an education,
it is very unlikely that their offspring will be more educated than their parents. In Guatemala,
there is also limited occupational mobility, and so despite the rising economy people are still
stuck in the jobs their parents had. Guatemala’s middle class is composed of 9.2 percent of the
population, whereas the lower class is composed of 85.9 percent of the population (And 66
percent of that is low-skilled workers). Thus, given the limited economic opportunity there is
clear incentive for Guatemalans to migrate to the United States given the lack of social
mobility.198
In contrast to Guatemala, El Salvador has had less international economic support and
thus their economy has suffered the consequences of instability. From 1999 to 2001 El Salvador
had large waves of migrations in response to agricultural shocks and natural disasters. In 1999,
across El Salvador there was significant livestock and agricultural loss due to the aftermath of
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Hurricane Mitch, and in 2001 there was an earthquake that severely impacted agricultural
production. As there were adverse agricultural conditions in El Salvador, there was an increase in
migration to the United States. In contrast, when the earthquake occurred in El Salvador there
was a decrease in the amount of migration.199 An explanation for this is that after the effects of
Hurricane Mitch the United States created the Temporary Protected Status for those to leave the
devastating aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, and thus there was a legal avenue for their migration.
However, generally loss of agricultural production and natural disasters that reduce economic
stability are motivators for migration in the context of El Salvador.200 This phenomenon is
particularly true for Honduras which is one of the poorest nations in the Global South, with half
of its population living in poverty. The unemployment rate is high, wages are low, and there is
no social infrastructure in Honduras. Hurricane Mitch further ravaged the nation and devastated
their economy (Sladkova, 189). The compounding of these devastating economic realities has
increased migration from Honduras to the United States, despite the typically harsh conditions of
the journey (Sladkova, 189).
US Immigration Policy H.W. Bush to Trump
Immigration Policy President George H.W. Bush (Insert UN Data on Migration)
Despite the lack of significant foreign policy in Central America during his tenure,
President H.W. Bush did pass significant immigration reform during his time as president. The
Immigrant Act of 1990 had a series of provisions such as: set a cap on total number of
immigrants, expanded employment based immigration, and set up a diversity lottery for visas. 201
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While this was an important milestone, it also included clauses that allowed for temporary
protected status. This allowed for El Salvador to gain temporary protected status in the face
natural disasters and civil wars, but it still ensures that if people do not show up for immigration
hearings than they can still be deported.202 This provided an avenue from people across the
region to have a legal avenue for migration, and as a result the number of migrants drastically
increased to flee the economic devastation from Hurricane Mitch. Although in the context of El
Salvador, the amount of migration decreased when the earthquake hit in 2001, due to the
inability to migrate to the United States. Finally the most important portion of this piece of
legislation is through the ways that crimes are defined, and the recategorization of aggravated
felony in the context of drug crimes allows for those who are convicted of any instance of drug
trafficking to be deported. This led to the drastic increase of gang members being sent back to
Central America, and expanding the gang culture in their homelands.203
Immigration Policy President Bill Clinton
There was legislation passed in the Clinton administration such as the Violent Crime
Control and Enforcement Act and the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act,
but these immigration acts were just addendums to reclassify crimes to ensure that more people
could be deported for smaller crimes. These laws were also passed as a way to ensure that
deportation proceedings could be circumvented for those who has committed petty crimes, and
that they could just be sent right back to their homelands without the help of the legal system.204
This legislation did not necessarily increase or decrease migration from any of the countries
being studied in this paper. Though this legislation set up the cycle of deportation of an increased
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number of those who were affiliated with crime in the United States (primarily gang members
from MS-13 and 18th Street), which increased the amount f people in Central America with gang
affiliation and therefore exacerbating the amount of violence in the region. While this policy did
not immediately implicate the number of migrants, the effects of this legislation would create the
conditions for the surge of migration as a result of gang violence that would occur decades later.
Immigration Policy President George W. Bush- President Trump
During these administrations there was a series of legislation passed, but it was all in the
context of increasing border security. Overall it did not deal with the nuances of asylum claims
being made by the people of Central America.205 When the influx of Central American migrants
hit in 2014 from the Northern Triangle, President Obama was unable to come up with a coherent
strategy for dealing with those fleeing the violence and economic hardship in the homelands.
President Obama was hesitant to label those fleeing as refugees, because that would have
mandated the US take responsibility in helping the migrants.206207 Consequently the lack of
response from the Obama administration ensured that the flow of unaccompanied minors and
migrants as a whole continued to flow into the United States unabated. There has been an uptick
in deportation during the Obama administration, but that did not stymie the flow of potential
migrants.
President Donald Trump has taken a different stance than President Obama on this issue.
Instead of attempting to protect Central American refugees, he has eliminated the clause that
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allowed children from Central America to apply for parole if their refugee status is rejected.208
President Trump has also decided to end the Temporary Protected Status of Salvadorans, and
they have until September of 2019 to go back to El Salvador.209 He has not created an official
piece of legislation that has attempted to overhaul the immigration system, but his current actions
prove that he is not attempting to expand the definition of refugee to provide protection to those
fleeing the Northern Triangle. In the wake of the rhetoric of the Trump administration one would
anticipate that there would be a decrease in the amount of migrants coming from these countries
to the United States, however the migrants fleeing are more afraid of the reality in their own
countries than the potential consequences of attempting to enter the United States.210
Conclusion
As of this point in time there is no solution to the problems that those who have migrated
face. They are not considered refugees, and they are dealing with an administration that is hostile
to all of those who want to enter. The violence that is occurring in their homeland does not
appear to be ending, and they are dealing with decades of policy that has not helped their
situation at all. They are fleeing gang culture and systemic poverty, and international law does
not recognize their claims for asylum as it is hard to categorize these migrants as a particular
social group. Even if the immigration policy of the United States was hostile towards migrants,
people were still willing to take the chance to escape the violence happening in their homeland. I
found this to be the main explanatory variable for both the period from 1960-1980 and from
2014-present. Central Americans wanted to get away from both state actor and non-state actor
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violence. Migration not happening during those two periods was a combination of the
independent variables to spur migration. Migrants were still willing to come during the 1980’s
due to quasi-favorable refugee protection, but ultimately people were going to migrate despite
the stance of the United States. However, since the Trump administration has been in place there
has been a decrease in the amount of migration from Central America. Additionally, there was
no data to support how much a person knew about US immigration policy before deciding to
migrate, and thus I cannot determine if migrants moved in response to US immigration policy.
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Conclusion
When examining what constitutes a migrant, the literatures most comprehensive
definition stems from the International Organization of Migration defines migration as “any
person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from
his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the
movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the
length of the stay is.” The flaw of this definition is that it ignores the nuances as to why someone
would move, and therefore we need definitions of migrant that highlight what is voluntary or
involuntary migration. Involuntary migration might be presumed to automatically be refugee, but
the literature still does not properly account for all the ways in which a person might obtain
refugee status. International law has codified refugee to mean “The person seeking refugee status
must be a person outside his country of origin or residence, must have left their home country
due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and thus owing to such fear he is
unable or unwilling to return.” However, when looking at this definition it does not isolate how
one determines well-founded fear of persecution, and misses whether the well-founded fear of
persecution can only come from state actors. Without acknowledging the violence of non-state
actors the current Central American migrants are left without a means to base their claims of
asylum on. Looking at the current political situation, it does not seem like there will be
significant adjustments made to the way in which we categorize what constitutes a refugee in
order to allow more people to gain asylum in the United States. As it stands only violence that is
perpetuated by a state actor is recognized as means for asylum, which ignores how foreign policy
can cause violence to be perpetuated by non-state actors. Therefore, there is exigency in
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attempting to redefine our understanding of refugee to ensure that people are protected regardless
of who is committing the violence.
Causes of Central American Migration in 1960-1980’s
International law has defined what constitutes a migrant and a refugee, but the
intentionally vague nature of these distinctions makes it difficult to describe migration/refugee
flows in Central America. When looking at general migrations among people, the general causes
for migration include: the state of the economy, social networks, loss of civil liberties, and lack
of political stability.211 All of these push factors do describe why there have been mass amounts
of citizens leaving Central American countries, however the delineation ignores that the violent
conflicts in Central America should constitute a majority of the people as refugees. However, the
line between refugee and migrant designations is primarily decided by whether a state or nonstate actor is committing the violence in Central America. As stated previously a person is
considered a refugee if they meet the following definition created by the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees which states:

[O]wing to well-founded [sic] fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 1951).

211

Leerkes, Leach, and Bachmeier, 2012

84

In the context of Central American refugee status, the most important points of using that
definition for deciding who is a refugee is fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.

After WWII Central America experienced massive amounts of rapid modernization due
to foreign investment in their economies. The modernization primarily occurred in the
agricultural sector for cotton and sugar exportation. Central America also attempted to reduce
tariffs (or even eliminate) in order to increase trade, and to also incentivize a regional market to
further attract foreign investment. Even though Central America did greatly increase their
economies, the modernization came at the cost of rural populations. Rural populations were
forced off their lands, transitioned from subsistence to cash crop farming, and many lost jobs due
to technology decreasing the amount of labor needed to produce products.212 Modernization
changed the political structure in Central America, and ultimately led to political repression.
Disenfranchised groups from rural populations started mobilizing politically to protest and
change their economic status and to protest the repression that was created by the oligarchic
governments in Central America.213214
In the article Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era Susan Gzech
articulates the violence that occurred due to the civil wars happening in Central America. Due to
the oligarchies’ led by military leaders’ decision to oppress large swaths of the rural population
civil war broke out in El Salvador and Guatemala. However, in Nicaragua, Frente Sandinista
overthrew the right-wing dictator Anastasio Somoza, which spurred civil war. The Reagan
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administration decided to use the civil wars in Central America as locations where the Cold War
could be fought, and to use the civil wars to show how the United States was defeating
communism.215 He sent support to the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala since they
were fighting Marxists revolutionaries. In Nicaragua he supported the contra rebels, since the
Sandinista government was socialist. Former President Reagan decided to deny the migrants
from El Salvador and Guatemala political asylum, because if he declared them as refugees that
would indicate that there were human rights abuses being perpetuated by the governments that he
was supporting. He denied the evidence that the El Salvadorian government was responsible for
thousands of disappearances, murdering of the oppositional political leaders. Furthermore, in
Guatemala, he denied the Guatemalan government’s counter-insurgency campaign decimated
indigenous communities. The counter insurgency campaign by the Guatemalan government
caused thousands of disappearances, murders, and displacements. Instead of acknowledging that
those fleeing were leaving violent situations due to their governments human rights abuses
President Reagan classified people fleeing as economic migrants to ensure that he could still
continue supporting the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments.216 Therefore, while we can
see that originally economic conditions spurred the political uprisings, the main thrust of
migration was an attempt to escape the violence caused by the civil wars state sponsored
violence backed by the Reagan administration.
Responses to Central American Migration 1960’s to 1980’s
The 1980’s was an integral period of time for the United States in relation to U.S. refugee
policy. In the final months of the Carter administration, the U.S. Congress passed the Refugee
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Act. The Refugee Act was created as a response to the large scale migrations of hundreds of
thousands of people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The Refugee Act was an
attempt to expand eligibility for Central Americans to qualify for political asylum in the United
States. This legislation was seen as an avenue for the US to be in compliance with their
obligations to refugees under the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Previously the legal definitions on recognized people who were fleeing
Communism, but the Refugee Act used the phrase “well-founded fear of persecution” to expand
the definition of refugees to Central Americans. Once it was established that the Reagan
administration was going to promote their de facto “no asylum policy” opposition was mobilized
in the religious community. The Sanctuary movement was started by a Presbyterian church and
Quaker meeting in Tucson, Arizona. These congregations spurred the movement that provided
legal and humanitarian assistance to those fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala. The movement
caused court cases, and eventually led to the creation of the Temporary Protected Status which
protected people who needed a temporary haven.217
The United States response to increased migration looked promising with the Refugee
Act, but the Reagan administration quickly inhibited the ability for those fleeing to obtain
refugee status. Unlike previous conflicts, the nations of the Western Hemisphere were the
locations where refugees first fled to. In response to increased migration from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras countries came together to craft a response to the influx of people
attempting to enter their nation. Countries throughout Latin America created the Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees was written, which expanded the definition of refugees from the 1951
and 1961 Conventions Relating to the Status of Refugees to include those impacted by civil
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wars. Refugees under the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees were persons who, “persons who
have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.218 By adopting this definition
any country who ratified the declaration were obligated to protect those who met the criteria of
refugee with the protections guaranteed under the 1951 and 1967 conventions. While this was a
great first step to handling the influx of people across Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration
on Refugees had no enforcement mechanism. Consequently, the Contadora Group was
established to provide an enforcement or regulatory regime for migration in Central America.
Contadora Group was a negotiation process that was started in 1983 in order to find a
solution to the Central American migration crisis (and hopefully creating a treaty to deal with
this matter). The primary justification for the creation of Contadora was that the United States
and Nicaragua could not agree on which organization would best help them find a favorable
solution to the conflict, while Latin American countries were worried that the conflict in Central
America would spill over to the rest of the continent. Nicaragua was unwilling to work with the
Organization of American States, because it feared the members of the OAS were controlled by
the United States. Whereas the United States refused to work with the United Nations to resolve
the conflict, because the United Nations would favor the interests of the Nicaraguans when
trying to resolve the conflict. Thus, the Contadora Group was established in order to create a
negotiating body that would not favor the interests of the United States or Nicaragua. In
September of 1983, the Contadora group drafted the 21 points of the Document of Objectives.
The “Acta” (as it was referred to among policy makers) wanted to achieve national
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reconciliation, an end to support for paramilitary forces across borders, control of the regional
arms race, reduction of foreign military advisers and troops, and prohibition of foreign military
bases. Nicaragua’s Sandinista government quickly accepted the “Acta”, while it was promptly
rejected by the United States. While Nicaragua would not have to take large amounts of action to
enforce the “Acta,” the United States would have been forced to accept major concessions if they
were to accept the agreement. Ultimately negotiations between the US and Nicaragua failed,
because other Central Americans were funded by the United States (which led them to reject the
actions of Nicaragua) (Purcell, 1985). Therefore, we can see that the policy responses from the
United States and regional actors were not satisfactory to deal with the Central American
migration levels caused by the civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.
Causes of Central American Migration 1990-Present
Despite the Reagan administration’s reluctance to classify migrants as refugees, many
Central American “economic migrants” were denied political asylum based on the violence that
they were experiencing due to the civil wars in their countries of origin due to the rhetoric of
them being categorized as economic migrants. Despite the erroneous labeling of economic
migrants by President Reagan during the 1980’s, that term does accurately describe the migrants
from the 1990’s and early 2000’s. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were all hit by
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which was the impetus for the creation of the Temporary Protected
Status program by the United States to help those impacted by Hurricane Mitch. Additionally,
there were a series of other natural disasters that hindered recovery efforts, and as a result people
migrated for better economic opportunity which was hindered by the effects of the natural
disasters and the lack of social mobility in each of these nations.
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The general perception among US policy makers is that if a person is coming to the
United States from below the southern border that they are merely looking for better economic
opportunities. According to a 2007 report by the United Nations, that there has been a drastic
increase in the number of gangs in Central America. The report stated that gang membership per
100,000 people was calculated as: Nicaragua 81, Guatemala 111, and El Salvador 12.219

One of the primary concerns is that a majority of those currently fleeing from Central
America due to gang violence are unaccompanied minors. Given that they are minors it
complicates the ability for officials can deal with their lack of documentation to prove that they
have legitimate claims to political asylum. Gang violence has increased in these countries, but
their reception by host countries was mixed. Given the violence that was occurring some people
advocated that a humanitarian crisis was occurring, and thus there are international obligations to
those who are seeking asylum. Other people acknowledged that there was gang violence, but that
the “pull” factors to nations like the United States meant that the migrants were taking advantage
of the violence in their state to gain political asylum in the United States220221222223224Therefore, if
the people migrated due to push factors nations do have an obligation, but if the migration was
primarily spurred by pull factors then nations could prioritize a response of border enforcement
versus a humanitarian response. The Obama administration’s immediate response to the surge in
Central Americans focused on the pull factors that spurred migration, thus he created measures
to increase border security. However, given that the harsh policies instituted by the Obama
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administration did not deter migration, the presumption is that people are choosing to migrate
due to push factors rather than pull factors.225 I will primarily be using the framework of push
factors that spurred the 2013 surge in migration to analyze responses by nations, and the
effectiveness of policies instituted.

Those who are migrating are attempting to escape recruitment from gangs, intimidation
by gangs, or violence created by gangs. Statistically speaking there has been a recent increase in
violence due to gangs in Central America, however those seeking asylum are struggling to prove
that they have been targeted personally by the gangs due to their social group/political
affiliations. While international law does allow for people to seek asylum based on fear of
persecution, the criteria for determining persecution is difficult to prove in the context of Central
American gang violence. Previous case law cites, fear of “general strife” is not enough
justification to obtain asylum in the United States. Legal precedent has determined that
prosecution can be defined as an “extreme concept…mere harassment does not amount to
persecution.” To obtain refugee status, the person must have the ability to prove that the
fear/violence the applicant has experienced qualifies as persecution must be based on one of the
following five grounds: race, nationality, religion, political opinion and/or social group.
Typically gang based asylum cases attempt to establish that their persecution was based on
political opinion or social group membership. By not joining a political gang can be portrayed as
a political opinion, or young females/males are targeted for violence because they are being
recruited or refuse to join the gang.226
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Responses to Central American Migration 1990-Present
As of this point in time the only instance of major reform in the context of Central
American migration was the Temporary Protected Status created as a response to Hurricane
Mitch. President Trump just revoked the TPS program for Salvadorans in the United States, and
the TPS for Honduras is up for review in 2019. He has increased border patrol to stop the flow of
migrants from Central America, but has not proposed a comprehensive solution to deal with the
problem that started in the Obama administration.227
Results
There is a lack of official data that compares why each person decides to migrate from El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the United States (especially given the high rates of
unauthorized migration). However, the data does indicate that violence is the main push factor
for migration from Central America to the United States, but due to the economic inequality in
each of the countries there will always be a steady stream of migration to the United States. I did
not find enough support to analyze how migration changes in response to more open immigration
policy or US foreign policy.
Limitations and Future Research
This thesis was limited by the lack of official data from the countries concerning the
levels of violence during each conflict, but the data overall supported the hypotheses. Interviews
from migrants could have provided additional support for correlation between the literature and
actual rationales for migration. I think there are a variety of pathways that future research could
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take in the context of this thesis. It would be useful for future research to incorporate analysis on
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Additionally, future research should investigate the role that Mexico
and Costa Rica play as places for migrants to find refuge in the face of violent conflict. This
research was also limited by the lack of data that differentiated the total number of
migrants/refugees accepted by state and year. Therefore, the conclusions are generalizable
without data to substantiate the claims. Future research could also be done on how the rhetoric of
immigration policy influences migration rates.
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Figure 2 GDP in US Dollars
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Figure 3 Average GINI Coefficient 1960-2016
El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

47.6

54.8

55.4

Economic inequality - GINI (19602016)
According to the World Bank Gini Data

94

Figure 4 GDP in US Dollars
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